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Abstract 
This dissertation examines the systemic effects of private school choice in the context of 
two statewide, means-tested school voucher programs— the Indiana Choice Scholarship 
Program (ICSP) and the Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP). Specifically, I examine public 
school responses to private school competition from the ICSP and the LSP and the direct impacts 
of the LSP on racial stratification in public and private schools. In Louisiana, I show that the 
lowest-graded public schools had a modest, statistically significant, positive response to the 
injection of competition, with impacts ranging from .001 to .06 SD. In Indiana, the evidence is 
slightly weaker. In math, none of the four competition measures are significantly related to 
school-average performance whereas in English Language Arts, three out of eight results provide 
evidence of a statistically significant, positive competitive effect. Depending on the radius 
selected, a one-unit increase in the concentration measure (a modified Herfindahl Index) is 
associated with a .04 to .05 SD increase in school-average ELA achievement.  
Regarding racial stratification in Louisiana’s schools, I show that LSP transfers reduce 
racial stratification in the voucher students’ former public schools, but marginally increase racial 
stratification in the private schools. Specifically, 82% of all student transfers reduce racial 
stratification in the traditional public schools, compared to 45% in private schools. Overall, the 
articles presented in this dissertation demonstrate that private school choice programs have null 
to modest positive impacts on the students who remain in public schools. Given that traditional 
public schools are and will continue to be the primary provider of educational services in K-12, 
this is good news for public school students in states with expanding private school choice 
programs.   
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Introduction 
Publicly funded voucher programs currently operate in ten states plus the District of 
Columbia and Douglas County, CO. Furthermore, thirteen states use personal or corporate state 
income tax policies to indirectly subsidize private school tuition payments (Frendewey, Kump, 
Martinez, Malin, & Marcavage, 2014). In 2013-14 alone, the number of school choice programs 
in operation nationwide grew from 32 to 39 programs, bringing the total annual expenditures on 
private school choice programs to approximately $1.2 billion. The new programs that were 
passed this same year relied on political support from both sides of the aisle, demonstrating a 
blurring that has occurred within both major political parties of the traditional definitions of 
“public education.” Given the significant growth rate of private school choice programs over the 
past two decades and considerable bipartisan support for this issue, should we be hopeful or 
worried about what that means for the educational prospects of the 50.1 million students 
attending public schools in this country? 
The theory of reform behind market-based school choice programs is that all students— 
both participants and non-participants— would directly benefit from expanded choice and 
competition. In an open school choice marketplace, a wide variety of diverse schools with 
different pedagogies, curricula, and approaches to learning would spring up (Friedman, 1955), 
increasing the probability that an individual student would find an optimal school to match his 
needs and learning style. Families would benefit from being able to express their views through 
both exit and voice (Hirschman, 1970). Furthermore, it is thought that increasing the number of 
choice-based school reform programs would exert pressure on traditional public schools to 
improve, resulting in “a rising tide” of school improvement (Hoxby, 2001). By shifting 
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enrollment and the associated financial resources away from public school districts, competition 
among schools would be stimulated, leading to the more efficient use of available resources.  
On the other hand, opponents of market-based school reforms have raised concerns about 
the unanticipated consequences of these reforms, such as diminished resources and suboptimal 
academic experiences for the students who are left behind as well as increased stratification by 
race and income among schools. National and state media outlets regularly run opinion columns 
in which prominent politicians, teachers’ union leaders, and activists accuse private school 
vouchers of siphoning funds from public schools, arguing that private school choice programs 
remove financial resources from those public schools that are most in need of revenue in order to 
improve (McCall, 2014; Rich, 2014; Schrier, 2014; Weingarten, 2013). Moreover, others have 
criticized vouchers for removing academic and social capital from public schools, arguing that 
private school vouchers rob the public school students who are left behind of the positive peer 
effects of higher achieving classmates and the influence of motivated families who would push 
for overall school improvements (Epple & Romano, 1998; Ladd, 2002). 
Much of the school choice research up until now has focused on the direct impacts of 
school choice reforms on program participants— the students who depart their assigned public 
schools with a voucher or scholarship to attend a private school with state assistance. Yet, if 
choice is to have a profound impact on general educational outcomes, we need research that 
focuses on the public schools affected by school choice, since this is where the majority of 
students will continue to be educated. Despite impressive growth rates over the past twenty 
years, private school choice programs still only educate 308,000, or less than 1%, of all public 
school students in the U.S. As such, even if private school voucher and tuition tax credit 
scholarship programs continue to expand at their current rates, public schools will remain the 
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majority provider of schooling in this country for the foreseeable future. The impact of choice 
reforms will be most widely felt, therefore, through second-level effects on those students who 
remain in district-run public schools. It is vital that research documents what happens to student 
achievement and racial integration in traditional public schools as we change the circumstances 
in which education is provided. This dissertation addresses this need by studying the systemic 
impacts of two of the three largest statewide, means-tested school voucher programs in the 
country— the Louisiana Scholarship Program (formally known as the Student Scholarships for 
Educational Excellence Program) and the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program.   
There are two primary research questions addressed in the articles to follow. First, is 
public school achievement influenced by competition from a private school choice program? 
Articles one and two address this question in the context of the Louisiana and Indiana school 
voucher programs, using multiple measures of competition. Second, how do student transfers 
through a private school voucher program impact racial stratification in Louisiana’s public and 
private schools? Article three addresses this question in the context of the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program.  
Measuring the competitive impacts and effects on racial stratification associated with a 
school voucher program can be methodologically tricky so in the next two sections, I discuss the 
specific challenges of each research question separately to ensure clarity. 
 
The Challenges Associated with Measuring Competitive Impacts 
In an ideal scenario, researchers would use experimental data to measure the impact of 
competition on public school achievement. The design of such an experiment would proceed as 
follows. At the outset, families in a pair of neighboring cities would apply for a voucher and take 
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baseline tests. At the time of voucher application, families would not yet be aware of the results 
of the two-stage randomization process to determine the voucher winners, which would only take 
place after applications are complete. First, cities would be randomized into treatment and 
control groups. Second, within the treatment cities only, voucher applicants would be 
randomized into treatment and control groups, with treatment group students only receiving the 
offer of a voucher. By comparing the outcomes of non-applicants in treatment cities to non-
applicants in control cities, we could rigorously measure the spillover effects of the voucher 
program on those students left behind in public schools. Such a study has actually been 
conducted across a set of villages in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh (Muralidharan & 
Sundararaman, 2013). Figure 1 presents a graphical presentation of their research design.  
 
Figure 1. Design of Andhra Pradesh school choice program. From “The aggregate effect of 
school choice: Evidence from a two-stage experiment in India,” by K. Muralidharan and V. 
Sundararaman, 2013, NBER Working Paper No. 19441, p. 31. Reprinted with permission.  
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Of course, actually being able to implement an experimental research design in an 
industrialized economy like the U.S. would be highly unlikely. Thus, the primary challenge in a 
study of competitive impacts on U.S. public schools is generating the explanatory variable that 
documents the degree of competition experienced by different schools. The researchers must 
make a case for why the competition variable selected is not confounded with other factors of the 
educational landscape that influence schools’ achievement such as the characteristics of the 
particular population under study or the economic success of that particular community, for 
instance.  
It is also important for the researcher to select a window in time that offers an exogenous 
shock that disrupts the equilibrium so that the researcher can cleanly isolate the change in public 
school performance that is attributable to competition induced by the new private school choice 
policy. The unexpected passage of a piece of legislation authorizing a new private school 
voucher or tuition tax credit scholarship program can serve as a useful inflection point for 
researchers attempting to compare public school performance present and absent the competitive 
pressure of the choice program. As such, the studies of the competitive impacts of the two 
means-tested voucher programs presented in this dissertation rely on a panel data set that features 
a competitive shock at some point in the panel.  
In order to choose the specific set of competition measures to be utilized in these two 
panel studies of competition in Indiana and Louisiana, I review existing measures from other 
fields, such as international banking, healthcare, and management.  
In banking, competition is most commonly measured by market concentration measures. 
There are at least ten of these concentration ratios in use but the most widely used is the 
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Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which measures the distribution of production across firms 
within an industry (Cetorelli, 1999). In the United States, the HHI is also commonly used in the 
enforcement of antitrust laws in banking.  
In healthcare, the typical measure of market structure is also the HHI, although count-
based measures and distance measures have also been employed. Mukamel, Zwanziger, and 
Tomaszewski (2001) employ the HHI to measure the relationship between hospital mortality 
rates and competition. Held and Pauly (1983) also employ the HHI to study the quality of care 
provided to patients with end stage renal disease. Shen (2003), meanwhile, uses an indicator for 
whether or not there are five or more hospitals within a 15 mile radius of a hospital. She interacts 
this with the change in Medicare price and change in health maintenance organization (HMO) 
penetration to predict the quality of hospital care. Finally, both Gowrisankaran and Town (2003) 
and Kessler and Geppert (2005) instrument for HHI with hospital market shares predicted by 
multinomial logit models of hospital demand that rely on distance as the main determinant of 
hospital choice.  
Finally, the management field has relied upon density counts as a common competition 
measure (Carroll & Wade, 1991; Luca & Zervas, 2013; Swaminathan & Delacrois, 1991). For 
instance, Luca and Zervas (2013) show that an increase in competition— measured by the count 
of nearby restaurants serving similar types of food—  is a significant predictor of unfavorable, 
fraudulent restaurant reviews of competitors on the popular online consumer review platform, 
Yelp.com.   
 Because this particular study takes place in a different field than the competition studies 
described thus far, it could be problematic to simply transfer these measures to my analysis 
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without any evidence that density measures such as the count of competitors, distance to the 
nearest competitor, or concentration measures such as the HHI function appropriately as proxies 
for competition between schools. Fortunately, there has been at least one study that attempts to 
validate these measures for my context.  
Jabbar (2014) surveys all public schools in New Orleans and asks principals to name all 
of the schools they perceive as their competitors. She follows up with logistic regressions to test 
a large set of variables to see which variables best predict the existence of a competitive tie 
between two schools, as revealed by who the principals named as their competitors on the 
surveys. Jabbar demonstrates that the geocoded measures of competition commonly used in 
other fields perform adequately well, although they cannot fully explain who the principals 
perceive to be their competitors. For instance, results for one of the geocoded variables I use in 
my analyses—the distance measure— show that for every mile between two schools, the odds 
that two schools share a competitive tie decrease by 5%. Jabbar also shows that schools tend to 
compete with similar schools. For every one-unit increase in the absolute difference between two 
schools’ school performance score, the odds that the sending school will name that school as a 
competitor decrease by 3 percent. Interestingly, Jabbar finds that charter school brand and 
authorizer are also predictive of competitive ties. Although my study excludes charter schools, I 
generate a “diversity” measure of competition that captures private school type. Given that 
private school religious types have been shown to have distinctive “brands” (Trivitt & Wolf, 
2011), this variable should capture some of the same variation that charter school brand and 
authorizer captures in New Orleans.  
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In sum, the competition measures selected for this study are distance, density, diversity, 
and concentration measures, which have all been previously used in competition studies in other 
fields and have been validated for use in an educational context. 
 
The Challenges Associated with Measuring Racial Stratification 
Because the literature on choice and its impacts on racial stratification is relatively 
nascent, the tools available to conduct these analyses are still evolving. Relatively few studies 
rely on simple descriptive comparisons of choosers and eligible non-choosers, which rely on the 
theory that the departure of relatively advantaged students through school choice programs 
worsens segregation (Henig, 1996; Willms & Echols, 1993). The majority of analyses in this 
area draw upon translations of residential segregation indices commonly used by the Census 
Bureau and scholars studying segregation effects at the housing level (Archbald, 2000; 
Clotfelter, 1999; Garcia, 2008; Massey & Denton, 1993; Reynolds, Thernstrom, Braceras, 
Heriot, Kirsanow, Melendez, Taylor & Yaki, 2007). There are over 20 formal indices available 
with which to judge the degree of residential segregation. Popular translations of these measures 
include the dissimilarity index and exposure index, which are used to describe racial dispersion 
patterns within a school system. Yet these measures are largely inappropriate to judge school 
segregation because they are blind to segregation at the system (ie. district) level. More 
appropriate analyses use a community standard such as the surrounding metropolitan area to act 
as a benchmark of the desired racial composition (Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Forster, 2006a, 2006b; 
Greene, 1998; Greene, Mills, & Buck, 2010; Greene & Winters, 2007; Ritter, Rush and Rush, 
2002). A number of newer methods have also been developed that take advantage of panel 
datasets that track individual students over time (Greene, Mills, & Buck, 2010; Ritter, Jensen, 
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Kisida, & Bowen, 2012; Zimmer, Gill, Booker, Lavertu, Sass, & Witte, 2009). A number of 
these studies track individual students’ migration patterns as they transfer between schools, 
judging whether these transfers increase or reduce racial stratification by whether they take the 
racial composition of a school’s student body towards or away from the racial composition of the 
surrounding metropolitan or micropolitan area.  
To assist the reader in reviewing the most popular measures used to study school choice 
and its effect on school segregation, Figure 2 presents a typology of segregation measures used 
in an educational context. The particular measure used in the third article of this dissertation 
appears in the lower right quadrant of Figure 2: Transfer Measures with a CBSA Benchmark.  
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Typology of 
Segregation 
Measures 
Uses a Racial Composition Benchmark 
NO YES 
Data 
Structure 
Cross-
Sectional 
Descriptive Comparisons 
of Users v. Eligible Non-
Users 
(Henig, 1996; Willms & 
Echols, 1993) 
Within-District Sector Comparisons of 
School Racial Composition  
(Burgess, Wilson, & Lupton, 2005; 
Clotfelter, 1999; Frankenberg & Lee, 2002; 
Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 
2010; Fuller & Greiveldinger, 2002; Fuller 
& Mitchell, 1999, 2000; Garcia, 2008) 
 
Within-CBSA Sector Comparisons of 
School Racial Composition  
(Bifulco & Ladd, 2006; Forster, 2006a, 
2006b; Greene, 1998; Greene, Mills, & 
Buck, 2010; Greene & Winters, 2007; 
Ritter, Rush and Rush, 2002) 
Panel 
Transfer Measures with 
No Benchmark  
(Zimmer et al., 2009) 
Transfer Measures with a District 
Benchmark  
(Bifulco & Ladd, 2006) 
 
Transfer Measures with a CBSA 
Benchmark (Greene, Mills, & Buck, 
2010; Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, & Bowen, 
2012) 
Figure 2. Typology of Segregation Measures. 
 
Primary Contributions 
In light of the rapid expansion of private school choice programs nationwide, this 
dissertation examines the systemic impacts of two means-tested voucher programs on public 
school achievement and racial stratification in Indiana and Louisiana. In doing so, this 
dissertation makes three primary contributions. First, it validates a set of easy-to-implement 
geocoded measures for understanding how private school competition affects public school 
productivity. Second, it provides empirical evidence that public school performance is 
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significantly, positively influenced by an injection of competition. This is valuable insight for the 
policymakers who have forged ahead with 39 private school voucher programs across the 
country. Third, the estimates presented here cast doubt on allegations by the United States Justice 
Department that a private school voucher program in Louisiana impedes court-ordered 
desegregation efforts in public schools. To the contrary, the estimates presented here demonstrate 
that the statewide voucher program in question actually helps decrease racial stratification in 
Louisiana’s public schools. 
The first article exploits variation in the geographic location of Louisiana private schools 
to estimate the competitive impact of a statewide private school voucher program on public 
school math and English language arts achievement. Using a school fixed effects model over a 
three year panel, I compare “A” and “B” graded public schools whose students are not voucher 
eligible to “C,” “D,” and “F” graded public schools whose students are eligible. This article then 
employs a sensitivity analysis that has stronger internal validity— a regression discontinuity 
design— but a smaller sample to empirically validate the measure of competition used in the 
primary analysis. The goal of this article is to provide the first comprehensive view of the 
competitive effects of school vouchers across the state of Louisiana and to validate an easily 
implemented approach to measuring competition when a more reliable method such as an 
experimental or quasi-experimental design is not feasible. If the results from the rigorous 
regression discontinuity design are consistent with the results from the models relying upon 
geocoded measures, this study will build confidence in the geocoded approach.  
The second article presents an analysis of the competitive impacts of the ICSP, a 
statewide school voucher program that provides public funds to low- and middle-income families 
to cover tuition costs at participating private schools, both religious and non-religious. The 
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primary goal of this article is to examine the competitive impact of this school voucher program 
by exploiting variation in the geographic location of private schools in the state. Given that the 
ICSP has the potential to grow into the nation’s largest school voucher program, evidence of a 
positive competitive response or even of a null effect would reassure policymakers that public 
school achievement will not be harmed as the program continues to expand.   
The last article analyzes the racial-stratification impacts of the LSP, which has primarily 
targeted low-income, minority students. The primary objective of this article is to track 
individuals as they switch schools in order to measure the impact of the LSP on racial 
stratification in both public and private schools across the state of Louisiana. If LSP transfers 
have increased racial stratification in the voucher students’ former public schools, then this study 
would provide evidence that the program is impeding court-ordered desegregation efforts, which 
the United States Justice Department claimed when it sought an injunction against the program 
in August 2013. If LSP transfers have reduced racial stratification, however, then this study 
would provide evidence that the LSP is a voluntary mechanism to reduce racial homogeneity in 
Louisiana’s public schools.  
 The remainder of this dissertation consists of three separate articles and a conclusion. 
Articles one and two present analyzes of the competitive impacts of the statewide, means-tested 
voucher programs in Indiana and Louisiana, whereas article three examines the racial 
stratification impacts of the Louisiana Scholarship Program. The concluding chapter summarizes 
the findings of these three papers, offers policy implications, acknowledges any limitations of the 
research, and proposes a path for future research in this area.  
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The Effect of the Louisiana Scholarship Program on Student Achievement in Louisiana 
Public Schools 
By: Anna Jacob, Patrick J. Wolf, Jay P. Greene 
 
Abstract 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a school choice program that provides public funds 
for low-income, mostly minority students in low-performing public schools to enroll in 
participating private schools, both religious and non-religious. In order to be eligible for a 
voucher in 2012-13, students had to have a family income that did not exceed 250% of the 
federal poverty guidelines and must have been entering Kindergarten or coming from a public 
school that received a “C,” “D,” or “F” grade in October 2011. In its first year of statewide 
operation, almost 5,000 students from low-performing public schools used these vouchers to 
enroll in private schools at public expense. The primary analysis presented in this article exploits 
variation in the geographic location of private schools to estimate the competitive impact of the 
LSP on public school math and English language arts achievement, finding modest, statistically 
significant, positive impacts. Secondary analyses using a stronger identification strategy validate 
the primary findings, showing no impacts on the subgroup of public schools that experienced the 
weakest competitive threat.  
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The Effect of the Louisiana Scholarship Program on Student Achievement in Louisiana 
Public Schools 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a school choice program that provides 
public funds for low-income students in low-performing public schools to enroll in participating 
private schools, both religious and non-religious. Initially piloted in New Orleans in 2008, Act 2 
of the 2012 Regular Session expanded the LSP statewide, allowing thousands of public school 
students to transfer out of their residentially-assigned schools and into private schools across the 
state of Louisiana. In order to be eligible for a voucher, students had to have a family income that 
did not exceed 250% of the federal poverty guidelines and must have been entering Kindergarten 
or coming from a public school that received a “C,” “D,” or “F” grade in October 2011. In 
school year 2012-13, 9,831 eligible Louisiana students applied for an LSP voucher. Ultimately 
4,954 students from low-performing public schools used these vouchers to enroll in private 
schools. All of these students were low-income and approximately 80 percent were African 
American.  
This article examines public school test performance in those schools that were exposed to 
competition from the LSP in the first year of the program’s statewide expansion. The primary 
analysis exploits variation in the geographic location of private schools to estimate the 
competitive impact of the LSP on public school math and English language arts achievement, 
finding modest and statistically significant positive impacts in “D” and “F”-graded public 
schools. Effects are largest and consistently significant across multiple measures of competition 
in math achievement, ranging from .0011 to .0639 standard deviations. Sensitivity tests using a 
regression discontinuity design confirm that student achievement in “C”-graded public schools 
— which were the least affected by student transfers through the LSP — was neither helped nor 
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harmed as a result of the competitive pressures induced by the LSP. Thus, this study concludes 
that public school performance in math and English language arts experienced a modest, 
statistically significant, positive impact in those public schools that were most affected by the 
voucher program. 
 
Study Background 
Figure 1 displays a timeline of events related to the implementation of the LSP. On April 
18, 2012, Louisiana Gov. Bobby Jindal signed Act 2 into law and one month later, the Louisiana 
Department of Education launched a public awareness campaign to advertise the private school 
voucher program, which would begin in August of 2012. Students were eligible for the program 
if their family income was below 250% of the federal poverty guidelines and they were either 
entering Kindergarten or currently attending a public school that was graded “C” or lower by the 
state. Those students applying from “D” and “F” graded schools would be given preference in 
the voucher allocation lottery. School performance scores and letter grades had already been 
released to the public in October 2011, before the voucher program had even been announced. 
This satisfies an important condition for a sensitivity analysis we conduct, which uses a 
regression discontinuity design, by guaranteeing that school performance couldn’t have been 
manipulated so that schools would or would not qualify for the LSP.  
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Figure 1. Timeline of events related to competition from the statewide expansion of the LSP. 
SPS stands for School Performance Score; LEAP stands for Louisiana Educational Assessment 
Program; iLEAP stands for integrated Louisiana Educational Assessment Program; ELA stands 
for English Language Arts; CR stands for Constructed Response; LSP stands for Louisiana 
Scholarship Program. 
 
Theoretical Framework 
There are three channels through which competition from the LSP may impact public 
school performance. The first is a pure competitive response by public schools seeking to retain 
students and the associated revenues. By granting students the financial resources to exit a public 
school they are dissatisfied with, vouchers may provide public schools with a financial incentive 
to improve their performance. Those public schools that do not improve in measurable ways may 
find it difficult to retain students and the associated revenue.  Further, this general competitive 
pressure may be heightened by a motivation to maintain a school’s reputation and avoid political 
embarrassment by preventing a mass exodus of students. This could be magnified by pressure 
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from parents, prominent community members, and the state and national media, which has 
reported on the LSP extensively (Dreilinger, 2013; Santos & Rich, 2013; Simon, 2012). 
The second channel through which we might expect the LSP to impact public school 
performance is through a change in school composition as a result of losing the low-income 
students who qualified for a voucher. If these students are uniformly low-achieving and they exit 
in significant numbers, then their departure could result in higher average scores for the school as 
a whole. Conversely, if the voucher program has a “cream-skimming” effect and results in the 
departure of the most able students, we might expect to see lower average scores in the public 
schools they depart.  
The final channel through which competition may impact public school performance is 
the resource change associated with losing voucher students. By taking resources from low-
performing schools, it could be argued that the LSP prevents public schools from performing 
optimally, resulting in a general lowering of average school performance. In addition to losing 
the financial resources associated with a student transfer through the LSP, if the voucher 
program attracts the most motivated families, public schools will also lose the positive influence 
of these active, involved families and the example they set for other parents and students.  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, we present a summary of the 
literature examining the competitive impacts of private school choice programs. In the next 
section, we describe the empirical methodology and the data used in this analysis. The following 
section presents the results. Finally, the article concludes with a summary of the main findings 
and a discussion of the implications. 
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Previous Literature 
Studies of the competitive effects of voucher and tuition tax credit scholarship programs 
on traditional public school student achievement have been conducted in seven locations across 
the United States. Of the 21 total studies conducted thus far, all find neutral to positive results 
(Egalite, 2013). The majority of studies have taken place in the state of Florida and in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.  
Various competition measures have been used in the literature but regression 
discontinuity design (RDD) appears to be the most rigorous estimation strategy capable of 
identifying the causal effect of competition threats on traditional public schools. By comparing 
observations from two similar groups that fall on either side of and close to a pre-specified cutoff 
point, this approach approximates a random-assignment research design. Six Florida studies use 
the RDD approach, all finding positive, statistically significant impacts of choice-based 
competition on at least one of the subjects examined (Chakrabarti, 2008a; Figlio & Rouse, 2006; 
Greene, 2001; Greene & Winters, 2004; Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2013; West & 
Peterson, 2006). No RDD studies of the competitive effects of school choice have been 
conducted, thus far, outside of Florida. 
 Another very popular competition measure, used in the Milwaukee studies, is the 
percentage of public school students eligible for a voucher to transfer to a private school 
(Carnoy, Adamson, Chudgar, Luschei & Witte, 2007; Chakrabarti, 2008b; Forster, 2008a; 
Greene & Forster, 2002; Hoxby, 2003;  Mader, 2010). All six Milwaukee studies find 
significantly positive or neutral-to-positive impacts.  
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Additionally, at least four geocoded competition measures have been used in the 
literature, which involve mapping public and private school addresses in the location under study 
and using information such as the distance to the nearest private competitor or a count of 
competitors surrounding a public school as the competition measure. One criticism of geocoded 
measures is that they suffer from endogeneity bias because the locations where public schools 
demonstrate poor performance might be attractive to choice schools with a mission to enroll 
underserved students. This is more likely to be a problem in studies of competitive effects of 
charter schools, however. In Louisiana and Florida, the private schools in question — mostly 
Catholic schools — existed for many years prior to the creation of any voucher programs. Many 
of these schools were established in response to Catholic doctrine, which dictates that Catholic 
children should be educated in a Catholic school (Herbermann, 1912) and not in response to 
unsatisfactory public school performance.  
 The first type of geocoded measure commonly used is a density measure, which uses the 
count of private competitors within a given radius (typically 2, 5, or 10 miles) to gauge the 
degree of competition experienced by a public school (Carnoy et al., 2007; Greene & Marsh, 
2009; Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & Winters, 2008).  Proximity measures, on the other hand, 
use the distance between a public school and its nearest private school competitor as the 
competition measure (Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & Winters, 2007). A diversity measure 
considers the number of different types (eg. Catholic, Lutheran, etc.) of local private schools 
located near a given public school (Figlio & Hart, 2014). Finally, proxies for private school size 
include counting the number of enrollment slots available at neighboring private school 
competitors or using private school physical seating capacity as a proxy for private school size 
(Mader, 2010).  
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In Vermont and Maine, Hammons (2002) counts the percentage of a district’s budget 
attributable to students who were “tuitioned-in” as the competition measure, which is analogous 
to counting student transfers, finding significant, positive impacts on a composite of high school 
math, English, and science scores. Finally, both Carr (2011) and Forster (2008b) use a 
dichotomous variable to indicate whether or not a school faced the competitive threat of 
vouchers in a particular year, finding positive effects on proficiency passage rates and on 5th and 
7th grade math and 7th grade reading scores, respectively.  
Of the 21 total studies of competition effects, all but one study finds neutral-to-positive or 
positive results— a 2007 study by Greene and Winters of the federal voucher program, the D.C. 
Opportunity Scholarship Program, which found null impacts. This program is distinguishable 
from the other voucher programs that have been examined, however, because it was restricted to 
a relatively small number of students at the time the competition study was conducted and a 
“hold harmless” provision protected public schools from experiencing any loss in revenues as a 
result of students’ exiting public schools to attend a private school using an LSP voucher.  
In sum, a diverse set of identification strategies, ranging in rigor, have been employed to 
deduce estimates of the competitive effect of school vouchers or tuition-tax credits.  This study is 
the first, however, to employ two strategies simultaneously. First, four geocoded competition 
measures— with strong external validity and incorporating all relevant public schools in 
Louisiana— are used to estimate the impacts of competition on “C,” “D,” and “F”-graded public 
schools. A rigorous regression discontinuity design with stronger internal validity is then used to 
validate the results of the geocoded measures where their samples overlap, resulting in the first 
comprehensive view of the competitive effects from school vouchers across the state of 
Louisiana. 
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Data  
The data for this analysis come from four total sources. First, student-level data on 2010-
11 through 2012-13 public school test scores for students in grades three through eight in math 
and English Language Arts (ELA) come from a restricted-use data file provided by the Louisiana 
Department of Education. Second, data on 2010-11 school performance scores and letter grades 
are publicly available on the Louisiana Department of Education’s website. Third, street 
addresses, latitude, and longitude for all public schools in Louisiana in 2010-11 were retrieved 
from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data, “Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey.” Finally, private school street addresses and 
information on religious orientation were retrieved from the National Center for Education 
Statistics’ Private School Universe Survey, 2011-12.  
Sample selection. Figure 2 describes the screening process for generating the analysis 
sample. Starting with the universe of public schools that appear in the NCES 2010-11 file, the 
first screen kept only those public schools that could be successfully mapped using ArcGIS 
software (approximately 90% of schools). The second screen required each school to have a 
minimum of three students taking the state test — the Louisiana Educational Assessment 
Program (LEAP) or integrated Louisiana Educational Assessment Program (iLEAP) — in grades 
3 through 8, reducing the sample from 1,326 to 981 schools. The third and fourth screens 
excluded charter schools, which already experience competition for enrollment and thus are not 
relevant for this study, and schools in New Orleans, where a pilot version of the LSP was already 
operating. This reduced the final sample to 939 schools, a total of 676 of which received a “C,” 
“D,” or “F” grade at baseline, making their students voucher-eligible.  
27 
 
Figure 2. Sample Selection Process 
 
Description of the analysis sample. Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for the primary 
analysis sample; the voucher-eligible schools are highlighted in bold. These lower-graded 
schools are distinguished from “A” and B” schools by having higher proportions of students 
qualifying for free and reduced price lunch, higher proportions of special education students, 
higher proportions of African American students, the lowest average test scores in both math and 
ELA and the lowest proportion of schools scoring above the median for those two subjects. 
Voucher applicants and voucher winners are mostly like to come from a “D” school and the 
average number of voucher winners per school is highest for “D” and “F” schools.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
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Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics by Accountability Grade 
  Progress report grade 
  F D C B A 
Number of schools 35 343 297 200 63 
Type of school      
% elementary/ middle  62.86 87.17 80.47 79.00 87.30 
% combination 37.14 12.83 19.53 21.00 12.70 
School Characteristics      
% free lunch 89.42 87.45 69.06 53.80 38.15 
% special education 23.80 14.21 12.42 11.28 8.10 
% limited English proficient 0.47 2.28 1.89 1.48 1.09 
% Black 84.28 69.69 33.65 19.53 24.69 
% Hispanic 1.05 3.53 3.65 3.28 2.88 
% white 13.32 24.11 58.83 73.13 67.65 
% other race 1.35 2.67 3.87 4.06 4.79 
Origin of Voucher Students      
Proportion of voucher applicants 8.43 66.34 25.00 0.24 0 
Proportion of voucher winners 7.87 74.00 17.93 0.20 0 
Average number of apps per school 5 5 2 0 0 
Average number of winners per school 2 2 1 0 0 
Test Score Outcomes 2010-11      
Average ELA standardized score -0.38 -0.25 0.03 0.22 0.50 
Average math standardized score -0.39 -0.27 0.02 0.23 0.58 
% of schs above median ELA score 0.06 0.07 0.64 0.97 0.97 
% of schs above median math score 0.06 0.06 0.65 0.97 0.97 
Test Score Outcomes 2011-12      
Average ELA standardized score -0.35 -0.26 0.02 0.19 0.48 
Average math standardized score -0.35 -0.27 0.00 0.21 0.58 
% of schs above median ELA score 0.06 0.08 0.64 0.95 0.97 
% of schs above median math score 0.06 0.10 0.62 0.94 0.97 
Test Score Outcomes 2012-13      
Average ELA standardized score -0.34 -0.25 0.00 0.16 0.47 
Average math standardized score -0.32 -0.26 -0.02 0.17 0.51 
% of schs above median ELA score 0.09 0.11 0.62 0.94 0.97 
% of schs above median math score 0.09 0.15 0.59 0.90 0.97 
Note: Student characteristics are from the 2010-11 school year 
Source: Data on public school characteristics from The National Center for Education Statistics’ "Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey," 2010-11; Data on voucher applicants and winners and on test-
score outcomes provided by the Louisiana Department of Education 
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Competition measures. The primary research question addressed in this study is whether 
public school achievement is influenced by competition from private schools brought about by a 
policy shock occurring in the 2012-13 school year. In order to capture the different degrees of 
competition experienced by public schools, we exploit variation in the geographic location of 
private schools to create four geocoded competition measures: distance, density, diversity, and 
concentration. In order to avoid reverse causation bias, these four variables are generated using 
data from before the LSP was announced.  
The first competition variable is a distance measure, referring to the distance between a 
public school and its nearest private competitor. The underlying assumption informing this 
measure is that shorter distances equate to higher levels of competition for students (Figlio & 
Hart, 2014; Greene & Winters, 2006). We create this variable by plotting the geographic location 
of all public and private schools in the state of Louisiana.
1
 The proximity value is recorded as the 
crow’s flight distance— recorded in meters and converted to miles for analysis— between each 
public school and its nearest private competitor.  
The second competition variable is a density measure; a widely used approach which 
approximates the degree of competition a public school is facing by the count of private 
competitors within a given radius (Carnoy et al., 2007; Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & Marsh, 
2009; Greene & Winters, 2008). We draw either a 10-mile or 5-mile radius around each public 
school and count the number of private schools that fall within that boundary (Figure 3).  
                                                 
1
 All private school addresses (n= 359) and 90% of all public school addresses (n = 1,326) are 
successfully geocoded. 
  
 
3
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Figure 3. Public and private school locations in Louisiana. Public schools shaded green; private schools shaded orange. Left panel 
shows 10 mile radius around all public schools; right panel shows 5 mile radius. 
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The third competition variable is a diversity measure, which counts the different types of 
local private schools that are located within that 5 or 10-mile radius of a given public school. The 
underlying theory is that a more diverse selection of private schools should appeal to a broader 
range of families, thus increasing the level of competition (Figlio & Hart, 2014). School type is 
defined here by religious orientation. In order of frequency, the 18 religious orientations 
represented in the Private School Universe Survey for Louisiana in 2011-12 are: Roman 
Catholic, Nonsectarian, Christian (no specific denomination), Baptist, Episcopal, Assembly of 
God, Seventh- Day Adventist, Lutheran Church- Missouri Synod, Islamic, Presbyterian, Church 
of God in Christ, Jewish, Pentecostal, Church of Christ, Church of the Nazarene, Methodist, 
Other, and Other Lutheran.  
The final competition variable generated is a concentration measure or modified 
Herfindahl index, computed as the sum of the squares of the market shares held by each private 
school’s religious type. The values for the Herfindahl Index range from 0 to 1, with lower values 
corresponding to a smaller concentration of the share of private schools in the hands of just one 
religious denomination. Conversely, a Herfindahl score of 1 would indicate a monopoly on the 
private school market by just one religious type.   
Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the four geocoded competition variables. The 
average public school is 6.39 miles from a private competitor. Within a 10-mile radius, the 
average school has 11 private competitors and approximately two religious denominational types 
are represented. Just one school has the maximum density value of 100 and a further 13 schools 
have density values greater than or equal to 90; all of these schools are located in Jefferson 
Parish. Finally, the modified Herfindahl Index has an average value of .11, which is indicative of 
strong competitive pressure. The mean values for this set of variables are predictably smaller 
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within a 5-mile radius — the average school has five private competitors and only one religious 
denominational type is represented. The modified Herfindahl Index has an average value of .16, 
which is suggestive of strong competitive pressure.  
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics of Geocoded Competition Measures 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Distance: Miles to nearest private school competitor 6.39 8.23 .04 49.85 
Competition Measures in 10 mile Radius     
Density: Number of local private schools  11.46 19.73 0 100 
Diversity: Number of religious types represented 2.06 2.25 0 9 
Concentration: Herfindahl Index .11 .19 0 1 
Competition Measures in 5 mile Radius     
Density: Number of local private schools  5.07 9.10 0 59 
Diversity: Number of religious types represented  1.25 1.77 0 8 
Concentration: Herfindahl Index .16 .26 0 1 
Note: Authors’ calculations  
Source: Public school data from The National Center for Education Statistics’ "Public Elementary/Secondary School 
Universe Survey," 2010-11; Private school addresses from the National Center for Education Statistics’ “Private 
School Universe Survey,” 2011-12. 
 
Methodology 
A school fixed effects model is employed to estimate the effect of private school 
competition on public school performance, building upon the model estimated by Figlio and Hart 
(2014).  
(1)                                                             
Yist is the standardized math or reading score for student i in school s in year t; Yist-1 is the 
student’s lagged test score; αs is a school fixed effect; Cs is the measure of pre-policy competitive 
pressure facing school s; Pt is an indicator variable identifying the post-policy year; CDFt is an 
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indicator variable identifying those schools that became voucher eligible because they received a 
“C,” “D,” or “F” grade from the state in 2011; Xit is a  vector of student demographic control 
variables including gender, race, special education status, an indicator for limited English 
proficiency (LEP), and eligibility for free/reduced lunch for student i in year t; Sst is a vector of 
time-varying school characteristics (shares of students of each race and gender, the share eligible 
for free/reduced lunch, and the shares classified as LEP or special education); and Tt is a set of 
dummy variables indicating year. The β coefficient on the three-way-interaction of competition 
measures, post-policy year indicator, and a school’s “C,” “D,” or “F” grade is the parameter of 
interest. Standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
 
Results 
 Table 3 presents the primary results. Each cell represents the coefficient on the three-way 
interaction between competition measure, post-policy year, and “C,” “D,” or “F” school grade. 
Regressions are run separately for each competition measure. For the discussion of results, we 
focus on the smaller of the two radii— the 5-mile radius — in order to be consistent with 
previous work in this area (eg. Figlio & Hart, 2014) although the results for both a 10 mile and 5 
mile radius are presented. 
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Table 3 
School Fixed Effects Regression Estimates of the Impact of LSP Competition on Public School 
Achievement, First Year Impacts 
 10 Mile Radius  5 Mile Radius 
 ELA 
(1) 
Math 
(2) 
 ELA 
(3) 
Math 
(4) 
Main Results      
Distance (r)  -.06 
(.04) 
.02 
(.06) 
 
-.06 
(.04) 
.02 
(.06) 
Density .01 
(.01) 
.06 
(.02) 
 
.04 
(.03) 
.09** 
(.05) 
Diversity  .26 
(.17) 
0.90*** 
(.25) 
 
.21 
(.16) 
.61** 
(.26) 
Concentration (r)  2.25*** 
(.65) 
3.74*** 
(.91) 
 
1.96*** 
(.74) 
3.57*** 
(1.08) 
"C" Schools Only 
(n=297) 
     
Distance (r)  -.10** 
(.04) 
.00 
(.06) 
 
-.10** 
(.04) 
.00 
(.06) 
Density .01 
(.03) 
.06 
(.04) 
 
.02 
(.06) 
.10 
(.09) 
Diversity  .10 
(.25) 
.75** 
(.35) 
 
.02 
(.26) 
.38 
(.38) 
Concentration (r)  1.12 
(.86) 
3.08*** 
(1.20) 
 
.80 
(.97) 
3.28** 
(1.47) 
"D" Schools Only 
(n=344) 
     
Distance (r)  -.06 
(.08) 
.10 
(.11) 
 
-.06 
(.08) 
-.10 
(.11) 
Density .02 
(.02) 
.06** 
(.03) 
 
.06 
(.04) 
.11** 
(.05) 
Diversity  .49** 
(.21) 
1.16*** 
(.31) 
 
.46** 
(.21) 
.86*** 
(.33) 
Concentration (r)  2.88*** 
(.74) 
4.18*** 
(1.09) 
 
2.57*** 
(.83) 
3.94*** 
(1.24) 
"F" Schools Only  
(n=35) 
     
Distance (r)  .02 
(1.21) 
1.90* 
(.98) 
 
.02 
(1.21) 
1.90* 
(.98) 
Density .01 
(.08) 
.23*** 
(.09) 
 
.03 
(.17) 
.43** 
(.18) 
Diversity  .93 
(.74) 
1.62* 
(.91) 
 
.09 
(.69) 
1.88** 
(.84) 
Concentration (r)  5.40* 
(2.78) 
6.17* 
(3.37) 
 
4.56 
(2.94) 
6.39* 
(3.69) 
35 
 
Table 3 (Cont.) 
Note: The dependent variable is the 2012-13 standardized math or English Language Arts; Robust standard errors in 
parentheses; Variables followed by (r) are reverse coded to ease interpretation; Each cell represents the coefficient 
estimate on the interaction between the competition measure, being a "C," "D," or "F" school in Oct 2011, and a 
post-policy indicator from a separate regression model. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for interpretability. 
Controls include indicators for gender, race, subsidized lunch eligibility, limited English proficiency (LEP), special 
education, year, percent of student body eligible for subsidized lunch, percent of each race, percent special 
education, percent LEP, as well as school fixed effects and prior year achievement; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
The top panel displays the main results across all schools, “C” through “F.” Competition 
is shown to have statistically significant, positive impacts on student achievement in math or 
ELA for three of the four competition measures used- density, diversity, and concentration.  
Each additional private school located within a 5-mile radius of a given public school is 
associated with a .0009 standard deviation (SD) increase in math performance.
2
 In terms of 
diversity, the addition of one private school religious type is associated with a .0061 SD increase 
in math. Finally, a one-unit increase in the Herfindahl Index is associated with a .0196 SD and 
.0357 SD increase in ELA and math, respectively.  Overall, a one-unit increase in competition is 
associated with a 0 to .0357 SD increase in student academic performance.   
In order to parse out the treatment effect to better understand which, if any, public 
schools may be affected by the LSP, the next three panels compare only a segment of all 
voucher- eligible public schools at a time. The second panel of Table 2 compares “A” and “B” 
graded public schools to just “C” schools, which produced around 18% of the total voucher 
winners (not including students coming from charter schools or schools within New Orleans, 
which are excluded from this analysis). Given the small number of voucher users coming from 
“C”- graded public schools, it is perhaps unsurprising that there is very limited evidence of a 
                                                 
2
 Coefficients in the table are multiplied by100 to assist with the interpretation of very small 
effects. 
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competitive response by this group of schools. In each subject, just one of the four measures has 
a statistically significant impact. Specifically, we find that a reduction in the distance between a 
public school and its nearest private competitor is actually associated with a decrease in student 
ELA achievement of .0010 SD. On the other hand, student math achievement increases by .0328 
SD with a one-unit increase in the Herfindahl Index. Given that we observe null effects using all 
other measures of competition with this group of schools, we conclude that it was unlikely that 
“C” schools responded strongly to competition from the LSP.  
The third panel reduces the treatment group to just “D” schools. Given that 
approximately three-quarters of voucher- winners in our sample came from a “D” -graded public 
school, this is the group for which we most strongly expect to find a competitive response to the 
LSP, if there was one. Indeed, the results observed for this group of schools are statistically 
significant and positive for three out of four measures- density, diversity, and concentration. 
Examining the impact on just “D” schools, the competitive effect ranges from .0011to .0394 of a 
standard deviation in math and from .0046 to .0257 in ELA. 
Finally, looking at the treatment impact on just “F” schools, there are null effects in ELA 
and consistently significant, positive results in math. Even though only 8% of voucher winners 
came from “F” –graded public schools, there were approximately five applicants and two 
winners per school. We find the largest statistically significant impacts for this group of schools. 
A one-mile reduction in the distance to the nearest private school is associated with a .0190 SD 
increase in student math achievement. Similarly, each additional private school competitor 
within a 5-mile radius is associated with a .0043 SD increase in math achievement. The result is 
even larger using the diversity measure, where each additional type of nearby private school is 
associated with an increase of .0188 SD in math outcomes. Finally, a one-unit increase in the 
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concentration measure is associated with a .0639 SD increase in student math achievement. 
Overall, the results for “D” and “F” schools suggest that those schools in the sample that 
experienced the greatest loss of students to the LSP responded with a modest yet positive 
increase in student outcomes, particularly in math.  
Sensitivity Analysis 
While the primary analysis has strong external validity given that it incorporates all “C” 
through “F” public schools in the state, it is possible that these four competition measures are not 
accurately measuring the competitive pressure experienced by public schools in Louisiana. As a 
sensitivity check of the primary results, we employ an alternative identification strategy with 
stronger internal validity — a regression discontinuity design (RDD) — to see if the main results 
can be replicated.  
The LSP is an ideal situation to apply an RDD analysis because school exposure to 
competition from the LSP depends upon ratings from the Louisiana letter grade system for public 
schools, part of the school and district accountability system. Letter grades are determined by a 
continuous measure known as the school performance score, which is an index of proficiency 
status in ELA, math, science, and social studies, and expected normative student longitudinal 
growth. Intervals along the school performance score continuum equate to a given letter grade. 
Low-income students wishing to participate in the LSP must have attended a public school that 
received a letter grade of “C”, “D”, or “F” for the most recent school year in order for students to 
qualify for voucher eligibility. It is reasonable to expect that schools that scored at the lowest 
threshold for receiving a “B” do not differ in substantial ways from those schools that scored at 
the highest threshold for receiving a “C,” allowing us to directly compare schools in these two 
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groups. Those schools that received a “C” grade or lower in October 2011 were directly exposed 
to vouchers for their low-income students. A subset of “high-C” schools, therefore, constitutes 
the treatment group for the RDD competitive effects analysis. It’s important to note that, in 
contrast to the primary analysis, “high-C” schools in the RDD are deemed to experience the 
threat of competition even if there are no private schools nearby. Meanwhile, the schools that 
received a low “B” grade had a school performance score that was close to the “C” schools, but 
they were not directly treated by the program because they were just above the cut-point. A 
subset of “low-B” schools therefore, constitutes the control group.  
If the estimates obtained from the RDD analysis are largely consistent with the measured 
estimates for “C” schools in the primary analysis, we can be more confident in the validity of the 
primary findings.   
RDD sample selection. Starting with the universe of public schools that appear in the 
state’s school performance score file for 2010-11, we merge this information with the state’s 
testing file in order to measure school-average achievement in Math and ELA over the three-year 
time period of this study, from 2010-11 to 2012-13. The first screen excludes schools that do not 
appear in the testing files such as lower elementary schools serving non-tested grades, reducing 
the sample to 1,352. The second screen excludes schools that do not have more than 10 LEAP or 
iLEAP test takers in grades 3 through 8 in each year of the study, which reduces the sample to 
1,058. The third and fourth screens exclude charter schools, which already experience 
competition for enrollment and thus are not relevant for this study, and schools in New Orleans, 
where a pilot version of the LSP was already operating.
3
 This leaves us with 987 public schools, 
                                                 
3
 The sample size reduction associated with excluding New Orleans schools is small because the 
majority of New Orleans schools were already excluded by the charter school screen. 
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521 of which are schools that received a “B” or “C” grade in October 2011 (Figure 4). The final 
analysis sample will be chosen from these 521 schools, depending on the bandwidth selected for 
the RDD analysis, which is explained in greater detail in the next section.  
 
 
Figure 4. Sample Selection for RDD Analysis of LSP on Public School Performance  
 
RDD research design. To estimate the competitive impact of the LSP, a reduced-form 
regression is used,   
(2)    Ajt = α + γ Djt + β f(Pjt) + λXjt + ε jt 
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Ajt is the average achievement of students in school j, in year t; Djt is an indicator for 
experiencing the threat of competition — i.e., it is a binary variable that takes on a value of one if 
the school’s SPS score is 105 or lower and zero otherwise4; Pjt is a vector containing the school 
performance score (SPS) used to assign school grades; Xjt is a vector of school level covariates 
including an indicator for school type (elementary/middle or combination school), school percent 
female/Black/Hispanic/special education/limited English proficient, and percent qualifying for 
free or reduced price lunch. Finally, ϵjt is an idiosyncratic error term. A quartic polynomial is 
included in Pjt, to control for the functional form of the SPS. The estimated impact of 
competition from private schools through the LSP, γ, can be interpreted as causal under the 
assumption that, conditional on the school performance score, the assignment of grades is 
uncorrelated with the error term ϵjt.   
The strength of the RDD is that it doesn’t incorporate all eligible public schools — only a 
narrow set of schools above and below the 105- point SPS cut-off that distinguishes “C” schools 
from “B” schools. The more similar the SPS score of the “B” and “C” schools on either side of 
this cut-off, the more similar we expect these schools to be in both observable and unobservable 
ways, strengthening the internal validity of the analysis. An analysis of the distribution of school 
performance scores in 2011 shows that over half (53%) of all schools received “B” or ”C” 
grades, ensuring that a sufficiently large number of school observations can be drawn from in the 
RDD analysis to generate reliable estimates of the causal effects of school competition on “C” 
schools (Figure 5).  
 
                                                 
4
 The reader should note that none of the spatial measures of competition used thus far are 
reflected in this indicator. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of school performance scores in 2010-11 (excluding charters and schools 
in New Orleans). The dark vertical line represents the cut-off between “B” and “C” graded 
schools (105 SPS points). The thinner, dashed lines represent lower bound of a “C” score (90 
points) and upper bound of a “B” score (119.9 points), n = 987 schools total, 521 of which fall 
within the specified window.  
 
In selecting the width of the “window” of observations to be used for the RDD, we start by 
using the smallest bandwidth feasible, which is one point above and one point below the B/C 
cutoff. We also experiment with using wider bandwidths of five and ten points above and below 
the cutoff, which allow us to incorporate a larger sample of schools. Table 4 presents descriptive 
statistics of the samples of “high-C” treatment schools and the “low-B” control schools, 
depending on the bandwidth selected.  Although only 47 schools are included in the sample 
when we select the one point trim, t-tests confirm baseline equivalence between the two groups. 
There are no statistically significant differences in any of the school characteristics in our data 
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such as the percent of students belonging to minority races, the percent of students with special 
educational needs, or the percent of the student body that qualifies for the federal free and 
reduced price lunch program — a common proxy for poverty status. Furthermore, when we 
compare school-average, standardized ELA and math scores across the treatment and control 
groups with a one-point trim, the “high-C” schools have lower mean scores, but these differences 
are not statistically significant. Once we expand the bandwidth to a five-point trim, the tests of 
differences in school characteristics remain statistically insignificant but the lower mean scores 
of the treatment group of schools in both math and ELA attain statistical significance. Finally, 
once we expand the bandwidth to a ten-point trim, four out of seven of the school characteristics 
examined are statistically significantly different between the treatment and control groups. 
Additionally, in this widest bandwidth sample, the treatment group has significantly lower 
baseline math and ELA scores.   
Although the RDD analysis controls for all of the school characteristics tested in Table 4 and 
the school performance score that was determined by 2010-11 test score outcomes, it is possible 
that other differences between the treatment and control groups created by a five-point or ten-
point trim could confound the RDD results, which is why we rely on the results from the 
regression analysis with a one-point trim as our primary RDD findings.  
  
   
  
4
3 
Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics for RDD Analysis 
Note: LEP = Limited English Proficient 
Source: Data on public school characteristics from The National Center for Education Statistics’ "Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey," 2010-
11 
 
 1pt Trim  5pt Trim  10pt Trim 
  
Treat. Control Diff. p 
 
Treat. Control Diff. p 
 
Treat. Control Diff. p 
Count 23 24    104 104    220 173   
School Type               
% Elem/ middle  0.70 0.88 -0.18 0.139  0.77 0.82 -0.05 0.394  0.80 0.79 0.01 0.757 
% Combination 0.30 0.13 0.18 0.139  0.23 0.18 0.05 0.394  0.20 0.21 -0.01 0.757 
School Characteristics               
% Special Education 10.85 12.58 -1.73 0.157  11.40 11.55 -0.15 0.796  12.38 11.31 1.07** 0.015 
% Black 23.89 23.25 0.64 0.926  25.90 21.48 4.42 0.15  29.13 19.34 9.79*** 0.000 
% Hispanic 3.21 5.04 -1.83 0.368  3.34 3.81 -0.46 0.496  3.55 3.41 0.14 0.792 
% White 68.74 67.78 0.96 0.900  66.66 70.13 -3.47 0.29  63.66 73.16 9.50*** 0.000 
% Other Race 4.16 3.94 0.22 0.890  4.09 4.58 -0.49 0.647  3.66 4.10 -0.44 0.481 
% LEP 1.43 2.40 -0.97 0.441  1.49 1.41 0.08 0.847  1.80 1.40 0.40 0.336 
% Free Lunch 60.59 60.53 0.06 0.990  63.13 56.80 6.33 0.002  66.17 55.22 10.95*** 0.000 
Test Scores, 2010-11               
Average ELA Z Score 0.09 0.13 -0.04 0.293  0.07 0.19 -0.11*** 0.000  0.06 0.20 -0.14*** 0.000 
Average Math Z Score 0.07 0.12 -0.06 0.228  0.07 0.19 -0.12*** 0.000  0.05 0.22 -0.16*** 0.000 
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To better help the reader visualize changes in student achievement in the baseline and 
outcome year, we first plot kernel densities of school average scale scores for all “B” and “C” 
schools in the two time periods and academic subjects under examination (Figure 6). In the 
presence of a strong competitive effect, one might expect to see the performance of “C” schools 
to have shifted less to the left than the performance of “B” schools. A visual analysis of these 
graphs does not provide much suggestive evidence for the presence of a competitive effect in 
math. In ELA, the mean performance for “B” schools appears to have decreased but there does 
not appear to have been any shift in the mean performance for “C” schools. 
These graphs, of course, cannot signify a causal relationship between competition from 
the LSP and student achievement, however, because they are confounded by other factors such 
as student demographics and include all “C” and “B” schools. One must switch instead to the 
analysis that relies on a regression discontinuity design and a tighter comparison of “high-C” to 
“low-B” schools to reliably measure the impact of the LSP.  
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Figure 6. Distribution of School Average Standardized Scores in ELA and Math in 2010-11 and 
2012-13 for “C” and “B” graded schools. Densities shown for the 521 schools used in the RDD 
analysis. 
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RDD results. We next present a graphical analysis of the regression discontinuity 
estimation approach. The null results for “C” schools from the geocoded analysis are confirmed, 
as there does not appear to be strong evidence of a competitive response in “C” schools. Figure 7 
plots school average math and English language arts standardized scores against the “B” or “C” 
letter grade received. To aid with interpretation, these scatterplots include a locally weighted 
“Fan” regression line, which uses an Epanechnikov kernel function (Fan and Gijbels, 1996). 
Regressions are calculated separately for “B” and “C” schools and provide a weighted average of 
math and ELA performance for a given school performance score. Because the calculation of 
school letter grades was informed by proficiency rates on ELA and math assessments, one 
expects to see a relationship between the school performance score and the raw scale scores. As 
expected, school-level scores rise gradually within letter grade bands. There is a minor break 
between “B” and “C” schools in math outcomes in both years but nothing of significant 
magnitude to suggest any impact of competition on school performance. Figure 8 provides 
additional support for this finding. Plots of residuals from regressions that control for the factors 
used to determine school performance scores show there is no noticeable break in the regression 
lines for “C” and “B” schools.  
47 
 
 
Figure 7. School Average Math and ELA Standardized Scores in 2010-11 and 2012-13, by “B” 
and “C” letter grades (Raw). The solid lines plot estimates from a locally weighted “Fan” 
regression line with a bandwidth of 5 points. 
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Figure 8. School Average Math and ELA Standardized Scores in 2010-11 and 2012-13, by “B” 
and “C” letter grades (Residuals). The solid lines plot estimates from a locally weighted “Fan” 
regression line with a bandwidth of 5 points. 
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Finally, Table 5 presents the results of regressions in the form of equation (2), which confirm 
the graphical finding of null effects.  School average standardized scores in ELA and math are 
regressed on the school performance score, an indicator for experiencing the competitive threat 
(ie. being a “high-C” school), school-level demographic control variables, and indicators for 
school type (elementary/ middle or a combination school that consists of grades K-7 or K-8, for 
instance). All regressions are weighted by the number of tested students in that subject and have 
robust standard errors. Models 1 and 2 examine test scores from 2010-11, before the introduction 
of the LSP. We expect to find no significant differences in student outcomes, which is confirmed 
by the data. When we examine test scores from 2012-13, when the competitive threat was now 
present, there is still no difference in test scores between “high-C” and “low-B” schools, 
conditional on the school performance score. As a robustness check and to maximize the power 
of the RDD, we also increase the size of this bandwidth to five and ten points above and below 
the cut off to see if the inclusion of more schools alters the results, which it doesn’t. Finally, we 
also experiment with including lagged test scores but the indicator for competitive threat does 
not approach statistical significance in any of these specifications.  
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Table 5 
The Impact of Competition on Average School-Level Achievement, RDD Results Comparing 
"High-C" (Treatment) to "Low-B" (Control) Schools 
  2011 
(Baseline)  
2013 
 Math ELA 
 
Math 
 
ELA 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
“High-C” Schools -.10 
(.09) 
-.06 
(.07) 
 -.09 
(.08) 
-.02 
(.05) 
-.04 
(.04) 
 -.01 
(.06) 
.02 
(.04) 
-.04 
(.03) 
1-Point Bandwidth  ✓ ✓  
 
✓ 
   
✓ 
  
5-Point Bandwidth  
    
✓ 
   
✓ 
 
10-Point Bandwidth  
     
✓ 
   
✓ 
Observations 47 47 
 
47 208 393 
 
47 208 393 
Note: Estimates presented in standard deviation units. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted 
by number of test takers in each subject. All models include controls for school level demographics and school type 
(elementary/middle v. combination school). *** significant at p < .01, ** significant at p <.05, * significant at p <.1 
  
As a final sensitivity test, we rerun the RDD, this time comparing “High-D” to “Low-C” 
schools. One could argue that because the “D” and “F” schools received a higher preference in 
the lottery, the “C” schools didn’t actually experience a real competitive threat. Table 6 presents 
the results when we run the RDD on the margin between “C” and “D” schools. As before, all 
regressions are weighted by the number of tested students in that subject and have robust 
standard errors. Within any of the three bandwidths selected, there is still no difference in test 
scores between the treatment (“high-D” schools this time) and control (“low-C” schools), 
conditional on the school performance score. 
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Table 6 
The Impact of Competition on Average School-Level Achievement, RDD Results Comparing 
"High-D" (Treatment) to "Low-C" (Control) Schools 
  2011 
(Baseline)  
2013 
 Math ELA 
 
Math 
 
ELA 
 (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) 
“High-D” Schools .06 
(.09) 
.06 
(.08) 
 .05 
(.10) 
-.05 
(.07) 
-.04 
(.05) 
 .08 
(.08) 
-.05 
(.05) 
-.04 
(.04) 
1-Point Bandwidth  ✓ ✓  
 
✓ 
   
✓ 
  
5-Point Bandwidth  
    
✓ 
   
✓ 
 
10-Point Bandwidth  
     
✓ 
   
✓ 
Observations 47 47 
 
47 181 380 
 
47 181 380 
Note: Estimates presented in standard deviation units. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Regressions weighted 
by number of test takers in each subject. All models include controls for school level demographics and school type 
(elementary/middle v. combination school). *** significant at p < .01, ** significant at p <.05, * significant at p <.1 
 
Discussion  
The results presented in this article are stable across two separate analyses relying on 
equally plausible specifications. For the primary analysis, geocoded competition measures of 
distance, density, diversity, and concentration are employed. These measures have high external 
validity because they incorporate all Louisiana public schools, “A” through “F” and have been 
successfully utilized in similar studies of private school choice programs (Carnoy et al., 2007; 
Figlio & Hart, 2014; Greene & Marsh, 2009; Greene & Winters, 2007 & 2008). Results reveal 
statistically significant, modest, positive impacts on student achievement in those schools that 
experienced the greatest average loss of students through the LSP, the lowest-graded public 
schools. These impacts are largest in math and range from .0011 to .0639 SD in the “D” and “F” 
schools. 
As a sensitivity analysis, we also use a regression discontinuity design to test whether 
students in “high-C” schools that are exposed to competition from the LSP realize greater 
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performance gains than their peers in “low-B” public schools that are similar in many respects 
but are unaffected by competition from the program. Similar to the mostly null findings for “C” 
schools reported in the primary analysis, RDD estimates also find null effects across both Math 
and ELA.  
One interpretation of these results could be that the lowest-graded public schools simply 
experienced regression to the mean in later tests. That explanation is unlikely responsible for the 
findings of this particular study, however, given that the geocoded competition measures show 
that, within the categories of “D” and “F” schools, those facing a greater competitive threat 
improved to a greater degree.  
 Overall, the results of this analysis indicate that Louisiana public school performance 
improved slightly in those schools that lost the largest average number of students to the LSP, 
which is suggestive of a modest competitive response to the voucher program. It will be 
important to keep studying the systemic effects of the program as the number of voucher users 
grows over time and public school administrators and teachers have time to potentially 
coordinate a response. 
 
Caveats   
 There are a number of contextual factors that the reader should bear in mind when 
interpreting these results. First, recall that the degree of competition felt by individual public 
schools was quite small. On average, just 2 students left each “D” or “F” school and a single 
student left each “C” school in this sample. As enrollment in the program grows, we might 
expect the competitive response to grow too. Second, given the design of this analysis, it is 
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necessary to exclude charter schools (which already experienced competition for students) and 
all schools in New Orleans (where a pilot version of the program was already well- established). 
Thus, the results presented here only apply to traditional public schools outside of the largest city 
in Louisiana. Third, it is unclear how much power a traditional public school principal really has 
in order to respond to competition. In many schools, budget setting, policy development, and 
hiring decisions are made at the district level, leaving the principal with few assets to deploy in 
ways that might measurably impact student performance. Fourth, this analysis examines student 
achievement on standardized tests to judge the competitive impact of the LSP but public schools 
may respond to the competitive pressure of the LSP in other ways that are not captured by test 
score gains and thus would not show up in this type of analysis.  This might include effects on 
students’ non-cognitive skills such as persistence and conscientiousness that could lead to 
improved attainment outcomes later in life.  
 
Conclusion 
This article presents an analysis of the competitive impacts of the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program by comparing public school achievement in schools exposed to the threat of the LSP to 
achievement in those public schools that were unaffected by the program. Using two separate 
analyses relying on different specifications— one with strong external validity (the primary, 
geocoded measures approach); the other with strong internal validity (the regression 
discontinuity design)— we find modest, statistically significant, positive impacts in the first year 
of the statewide expansion of the program in those public schools that experienced the greatest 
competitive threat. 
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The primary analysis presented in this article exploits variation in the geographic location 
of private schools to estimate the competitive impact of the LSP on public school math and 
English language arts achievement using four geocoded measures of competition— distance, 
density, diversity, and concentration. We find modest, statistically significant, positive impacts 
ranging from 0 to .05 SD in ELA and .06 SD in math. In particular, we tend to find significant, 
positive effects in the “D” and “F”-graded public schools, which were the schools from which 
over 80% of LSP voucher winners originated. 
Secondary analyses use a stronger identification strategy to validate the primary findings, 
revealing null effects for the schools that experienced the lowest competitive pressure. We 
compare the achievement of students in public schools that received a high “C” grade from the 
state— thus making their low-income students voucher-eligible— to the achievement of students 
in public schools that received a low “B” grade, in which no students could’ve applied for a 
voucher. By comparing student achievement around the narrow “C”/ “B” grade cutoff, we are 
comparing two groups of schools that are similar in all other respects, apart from the competition 
experience, which creates the basis for a rigorous quasi-experimental analysis of the competitive 
impacts of the LSP. The regression discontinuity analysis finds no impact on math or English 
language arts performance in the “high-C” schools exposed to competition from the program.   
Based on the evidence from two separate identification strategies, we can conclude that 
competition from the LSP has had a null to modest positive impact on student achievement in 
Louisiana public schools, with positive impacts most likely to be found in the lowest-performing 
public schools.  
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The Competitive Effect of the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program on Student 
Achievement in Indiana Public Schools 
By: Anna Jacob and Kate Dougherty 
 
Abstract 
This article presents an analysis of the competitive impacts of the Indiana Choice 
Scholarship Program (ICSP), a statewide school voucher program that provides public funds to 
low- and middle-income families to cover tuition costs at participating private schools, both 
religious and non-religious. Geocoded measures are included in a school-fixed effects model to 
calculate the impacts of private school competition on public school performance in Math and 
ELA in the first year of the program, school-year 2011-12. These measures include distance, 
density, diversity, and concentration of private schools within a five- and ten-mile radius. 
Overall, the results presented here do not provide strong evidence of a competitive response to 
the first year of the ICSP. In math, none of the four competition measures is significantly related 
to school-average performance, whereas in English Language Arts, three out of eight results 
provide evidence of a statistically significant, positive competitive effect. Depending on the 
radius selected, a one-unit increase in the concentration measure (a modified Herfindahl Index) is 
associated with a .04 to .05 SD increase in school-average ELA achievement.  
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The Competitive Effect of the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program on Student 
Achievement in Indiana Public Schools 
This study analyzes the competitive impact of the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program 
(ICSP), passed as part of House Enrolled Act 1003-2011 (Public Law 92-2011). This school 
voucher program provides state-funded vouchers to assist low- and middle-income students with 
the payment of tuition and fees at participating private schools, including both religious and non-
religious options. Enrollment in the ICSP has grown every year the program has been in 
operation (Table 1). During the 2011-12 school year, ICSP scholarships were limited to 7,500 
students; that number doubled in the program’s second year of operation and, for the 2013-14 
school year, the enrollment cap was removed altogether so that ICSP scholarships could be 
awarded to all eligible student applicants. During the 2013 legislative session, eligibility criteria 
were expanded to include a broader cross-section of students, incorporating students with special 
educational needs, siblings of current ICSP scholarship users, and students coming from failing 
public schools.   
 
Table 1. Growth in Indiana Choice Scholarship Program Participation, Students and Schools 
Year of Operation Student 
Enrollment Cap 
Student Program 
Participation 
Private School 
Program Participation 
First Year (2011-12) 7,500 3,911 241 
Second Year (2012-13) 15,000 9,139 289 
Third Year (2013-14) N/A 19,809 313 
Source: Choice Scholarship Program Annual Report: Participation and Payment Data 2011-12, 2012-13 & 2013-14. 
Prepared by the Indiana Department of Education Office of School Finance, January 27, 2014. 
 
Due to limitations on the availability of data, this study measures the competitive impacts 
of the ICSP in its first year of operation only, the 2011-12 school year. It is appropriate to test for 
62 
 
a competitive response in the program’s first year for at least two reasons. First, even though the 
size of the program was relatively small in 2011-12, stakeholders and the general public were 
aware that the enrollment cap would increase substantially every year, with estimates at the time 
suggesting that as many as 62 percent of Indiana families would eventually be eligible to 
participate.
5
 Despite its initial size, the program was clearly perceived by many observers as a 
serious threat to Indiana’s public schools. Shortly after the program’s announcement, for 
instance, a group of taxpayers represented by the National Education Association filed suit 
against the program in an attempt to block it. This lawsuit progressed through the courts until it 
reached the Indiana Supreme Court, where it was settled in March 2013. As such, it is reasonable 
to assume that the program was sufficiently threatening to generate a competitive response from 
Indiana’s public schools in its first year of operation.  
Second, because student enrollment numbers were so small the first year of the ICSP, 
analyzing just this year of data actually allows us to measure the pure competitive impact more 
cleanly than is possible in later years, when compositional and resource changes altered the 
populations of the sending public schools. As larger numbers of students continue to migrate 
from their residentially-assigned public schools to participating private schools, it becomes 
harder to isolate the incentive effect of the ICSP using the available aggregate school-level data.  
In the third year of the program, for instance, almost 20,000 students used an ICSP voucher to 
transfer schools, resulting in perceptible revenue impacts and changes in the student bodies of 
traditional public schools that could equally affect student achievement as much as a pure 
competitive shock.      
                                                 
5
 See for instance the July 21, 2011 press release titled, ‘Institute for Justice Moves to Intervene 
in Defense of School choice Program’, which cites the 62 percent figure, which was later 
repeated in numerous media reports: http://www.ij.org/indiana-school-choice-release-7-21-2011  
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Theoretical Framework 
Reform policies that foster the development of market forces in education are 
increasingly popular in the United States as a channel through which to address widespread 
discontent with student performance (Chubb & Moe, 1990; Friedman, 1962). Economic theory 
suggests that such policies will result in participant and systemic impacts that will raise the 
quality of education in the private schools accepting publicly-funded school vouchers or tuition 
tax credit scholarships and in the traditional public schools as well.  
Across much of the United States, traditional public schools operate a monopoly over 
neighborhood schooling options, resulting in weak incentives for these residentially-assigned 
public schools to address instructional, curricular, or organizational deficits whose improvement 
would appeal to students and their families. Although families are free to exercise residential 
choice and thus simultaneously choose their desired public school (Tiebout, 1956), Tiebout 
choice is limited and often impacted by other factors such as cost, access to popular 
transportation routes, or proximity to friends and family. This can be especially limiting for 
economically disadvantaged families, resulting in unequal schooling opportunities for students 
from lower-income backgrounds. The introduction of market mechanisms via voucher or tuition 
tax credit scholarships, however, alters this dynamic and may strengthen the competitive 
incentive for public schools so that only those schools with higher student achievement per dollar 
spent are rewarded (Friedman, 1962).  
There are at least three responses we might hypothesize that would result from injecting 
competitive pressure into K-12 public schooling. On the one hand, school leaders may 
implement reforms that use existing resources more efficiently, encourage innovation, and 
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organize staffing and curricula in a manner that is maximally responsive to student needs. If this 
is the case, we might observe a general rise in test scores for those schools experiencing the 
strongest competitive pressures. On the other hand, competition from the ICSP may force 
traditional public schools to cut expensive programs, limit instructional and administrative staff, 
increase class sizes, and result in a general lowering of morale and decline in school-wide 
performance. This could be exacerbated by compositional and resource changes if the highest-
achieving and most motivated students exit the system en masse. Of course, the third 
hypothesized response is none at all. If the threat from competition is trivial or schools simply 
respond with empty symbolic gestures (Hess, 2002), the impact of the choice program will not 
be detectable in school-average academic outcomes.  
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, we present a summary of 
literature on the competitive impacts of private school choice programs. We then describe the 
data and research design used in this analysis. The following section presents the results. The 
paper concludes with a discussion of the policy implications and acknowledges the limitations of 
the current study.  
 
Previous Literature  
There is a wealth of literature examining competition effects in K-12 education. A 
significant number of studies measure competition between public schools, for instance (Blair & 
Staley, 1995; Borland & Howsen, 1992; Hanushek & Rivkin, 2003; Hoxby, 2000; Marlow, 
1997; Millimet & Rangaprasad, 2007, Zanzig, 1997). Additionally, numerous studies have 
examined competition between public and private schools (Andersen & Serritzlew, 2007; Arum, 
1996; Couch, Shughart & Williams, 1993; Dee, 1998; Hoxby, 1994; Jepsen, 2002; Kasman & 
65 
 
Loeb, 2013; McMillan, 2000; Sander, 1999; Scheld, 2014; West & Woessman, 2010). The work 
that is most relevant for this study, however, is competition responses in traditional public 
schools occurring as the result of a private school choice program such as a tuition tax credit or 
voucher program. There have been 21 such studies examining impacts on student academic 
outcomes in 7 locations across the United States (Egalite, 2013). The majority of these studies 
have taken place in Florida (nine studies) and Milwaukee, Wisconsin (six studies).  
In the state of Florida, three programs have provided publicly-funded vouchers for the 
tuition of public school students wishing to transfer to private schools. The first is the Florida 
Opportunity Scholarship Program, established as part of the reform program known as the A+ 
Plan, which offered school vouchers to students attending public schools that were designed as 
failing twice in a four-year period. This program ran from June 1999 until the Florida Supreme 
Court ruled it unconstitutional in January 2006. In total, there have been 7 studies of the 
competitive effects of this program, all of which found positive competitive impacts on affected 
traditional public schools (Chakrabarti, 2008a; Figlio & Rouse, 2006; Forster, 2008a; Greene, 
2001; Greene & Winters, 2004; Rouse, Hannaway, Goldhaber, & Figlio, 2013; West & Peterson, 
2006). The second program is the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, established in 2001 
and still in operation today, providing vouchers to students from low-income families. Figlio and 
Hart (2014) found that increases in competition as a result of this tax credit program were 
associated with improvements in student test scores across a variety of competition measures. 
The third Florida program is the McKay Scholarships for Students with Disabilities Program, 
established in 1999 and currently serving approximately 24,000 students. A 2008 study by 
Greene and Winters found that increased exposure to this voucher program is associated with 
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substantial improvements in the test scores of students with disabilities that remain in the public 
school system. 
Established in 1999, meanwhile, the Milwaukee Parental Choice Program (MPCP) 
provides vouchers to low and middle-income families to attend private schools at state expense. 
All six studies of the competitive effects of the MPCP have shown a mixture of neutral-to-
positive to positive results (Carnoy et al., 2007; Chakrabarti, 2008b; Greene & Forster, 2002; 
Greene & Marsh, 2009; Hoxby, 2003; Mader, 2010). Meanwhile, studies of competition effects 
from school voucher or tuition tax credit programs have also been conducted in Ohio (Carr, 
2011; Forster, 2008b), Texas (Greene & Forster, 2002; Merrifield & Gray, 2009), Washington 
D.C. (Greene & Winters, 2007), Maine (Hammons, 2002), and Vermont (Hammons, 2002). Of 
these 21 studies, only one — an analysis of a voucher program in Washington D.C. — showed 
no impacts across all subjects (Greene & Winters, 2007).  
A competitive effects analysis of the Indiana Choice Scholarship Program offers a 
number of distinct advantages over existing studies in this area. First, this study can take 
advantage of the geographic diversity of a major school voucher program affecting students 
across the entire state of Indiana whereas much of the previous work in this area has examined 
impacts within a single city. The broad geographic scope of the program maximizes the variation 
in competition faced by public schools throughout Indiana, increasing the external validity of the 
study and, thus, the opportunity for results to be relevant in other contexts. Second, this analysis 
of the competitive effects of the ICSP has a strong identification strategy that takes advantage of 
a panel dataset instead of running a descriptive analysis of cross-sectional data. By applying a 
school fixed effects model, this analysis takes full advantage of the policy change that resulted in 
the introduction of the program, comparing pre-program trends to achievement outcomes after 
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the introduction of the policy. Third, although a number of studies already exist that examine the 
impact of a statewide school voucher program in Florida, such studies are unable to disentangle 
the accountability effects of the A-F school letter grading policy from the competitive effects of 
the voucher threat for consistently low-performing schools because both policies were 
implemented at the same time. In Indiana, however, the A-F school letter grading policy predates 
the introduction of the voucher program making it possible to compare achievement trends 
before and after the introduction of the voucher program, net of the accountability impact of the 
letter grading policy.  
 
Data  
The data for this project come from three total sources. First, data on public school math 
and English Language Arts (ELA) performance on the state test, the ISTEP+, were downloaded 
from the Indiana Department of Education’s Assessment website for school years 2008-09 
through 2011-12. The ISTEP+ is administered annually in grades 3 through 8 and used for 
school and student accountability purposes. Test results are provided to the public in a format 
that is broken out by grade level within individual schools. Second, the physical addresses of all 
public schools and general demographic information for these schools were retrieved from the 
Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey, which is publicly available from the 
National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core of Data. Third, the physical addresses of 
all private schools in the state were retrieved from the Private School Universe Survey (PSS), 
which can also be downloaded from the National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core 
of Data.  
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 The Indiana Department of Education publishes the grade-level means and standard 
deviations for the entire state on the annual ISTEP+. This information was used to standardize 
test scores within grade before averaging across grades to create a school-average standardized 
score.  
Sample selection. Figure 1 describes the sample selection process for the ICSP 
competition analysis. Starting with the universe of public schools that appeared in the state’s 
testing files from 2008-09 through 2011-12, only schools that could be successfully merged with 
demographic data from NCES’ Common Core of Data were kept. This reduced the sample to 
1,442. One hundred percent of these schools were successfully mapped using the geocoding 
software, Arc-GIS (Figures 2 and 3). Finally, 38 charter schools were removed from the sample 
as charter schools are not relevant for this study, given that they already experience competition 
for enrollment.  
 
Figure 1. Sample Selection for Competition Analysis of ICSP on Public School Performance.   
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Figure 2. Public and Private School Locations in Indiana. Public schools shaded red; Private 
schools shaded green. 
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Figure 3. Five and Ten Mile Radii Around Every Indiana Public School. Public schools shaded red; Private schools shaded green. 
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Research Design 
A. Competition Measures. We use the introduction of the Indiana Choice Scholarship 
Program as a policy shock that dramatically increased access to private school options starting in 
school year 2011-12. In order to capture variation in the competition experienced by public 
schools, we use a variety of geocoded competition measures that have been commonly used in 
the literature. These variables allow us to examine achievement impacts of the voucher shock on 
students in public schools exposed to the threat of competition. These methods can be organized 
into four distinct categories: Distance, density, diversity, and concentration measures.  
A distance measure quantifies competition by measuring the distance between a public 
school and its nearest private school competitor. In a metropolitan area, it is not uncommon for 
this value to be under a mile. The underlying assumption for using distance as a measure of 
competitive pressure is that shorter distances equate to a higher level of school choices for 
students and thus increased competition for enrollees by public schools. This measure has been 
previously used in studies of the competition effect of the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship 
Program and the D.C. Opportunity Scholarship Program (Figlio & Hart, 2010; Greene & 
Winters, 2007). For each eligible public school, we calculate the crow’s-flight distance in miles 
to the nearest private school that was in existence before the announcement of the program. To 
ease interpretation, we multiply the distance variable by -1 so that a positive coefficient on the 
distance variable would represent the impact of closer competitors positively impacting student 
outcomes.  
A density measure, on the other hand, quantifies the degree of competition faced by a 
school by counting the number of private competitors within a given radius. Such measures have 
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been previously used in studies of competition effects of the Milwaukee Parental Choice 
Program, the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program, and Florida’s McKay Scholarship 
Program for Students with Disabilities (Carnoy et al., 2007; Figlio & Hart, 2010; Greene & 
Marsh, 2009; Greene & Winters, 2008).  We generate density counts within 5 and 10 mile radii.  
A diversity measure counts the number of different types of local private schools that are 
close to a given public school. Using this method, competition is quantified by measuring the 
variety of schooling options available to students. Such a method has been previously used in a 
study of the Florida Tax Credit Scholarship Program (Figlio & Hart, 2010). In Indiana, we define 
private school type by religious affiliation. Potential values range from 0 to 23, which is the 
number of religious categories identified in the Private School Universe Survey.
6
 Thus, a given 
public school might have a value of 6 on the density measure, but if all 6 schools are Roman 
Catholic, it would only score a 1 on the diversity measure. 
The final competition measure uses a modified Herfindahl Index to capture market 
concentration. As described by Figlio and Hart (2010), this index is generated by summing the 
squared market shares held by each private school religious type within a given public school 
radius. Suppose, for instance, there are five private schools that fall within a ten mile radius of a 
given public school- four of these are Catholic schools and one is a Lutheran school. The market 
share for each school type is calculated as 
       
         
. Catholic school market share, therefore, is 
.80 (4/5) and Lutheran market share is .20 (1/5). The Herfindahl Index is the sum of the squares 
                                                 
6
 These categories are: Amish, Assembly of God, Baptist, Brethren, Calvinist, Christian (no 
specific denomination), Church of Christ, Church of God, Church of the Nazarene, Evangelical 
Lutheran Church in America, Friends, Islamic, Jewish, Lutheran Church- Missouri Synod, 
Mennonite, Methodist, Nonsectarian, Other, Pentecostal, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic, 
Seventh-Day Adventist, Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod. 
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of the market shares held by each school type — in this case (.80)^2 + (.20)^2= .68. Lower 
values of the Herfindahl Index are indicative of increased competitive pressure, as a lower 
concentration of the share of private schools is in the hands of just one particular religious type. 
Thus, a Herfindahl Index score of 1 suggests a monopoly market environment, where just one 
religious type has control of all private competitors within that radius. Conversely, a Herfindahl 
Index score of 0 represents a school market that is well-served by a diverse set of private schools. 
To ease interpretation of results, we use 1- the Herfindahl Index so that a positive coefficient on 
this variable would mean increased competition is associated with higher student outcomes and a 
negative coefficient would mean increased competition is associated with lower student 
outcomes.   
In order to avoid reverse causation bias, all four competition measures are measured 
before the ICSP was announced, using public school addresses from school year 2010-11 and 
matching private school addresses from the closest administration of the Private School Universe 
Survey, the 2009-10 school year. Additionally, we note that these measures are based on private 
school counts that weight all schools equally, regardless of school size. We deliberately chose 
such measures because we expect that public school administrators are more likely to be aware 
of the existence of neighboring private schools than to be knowledgeable about school size or the 
number of enrollment slots that would be made available to students using a Choice Scholarship. 
Finally, for those public schools that are not matched to a single private school within each 
radius examined, it is appropriate to assign a zero as the competition measure for all of the 
competition measures described above except for the concentration measure, where a zero 
implies a perfectly competitive market. As such, those public schools not matched to a single 
private school must be dropped for those analyses relying upon the modified Herfindahl Index. 
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In the results tables presented in the next section, the sample size is always smaller for those 
regressions measuring competition with the concentration index.   
Table 2 summarizes the four competition measures across both radii considered in this 
study. The average distance from a public school to its nearest private competitor is 4.49 miles, 
with a standard deviation of just over 5 miles. Within a 5-mile radius, there are typically 5 
private competitors, although the median value is just 2. One school in downtown Indianapolis 
has as many as 40 private competitors within a 5 mile radius. On average, 2 religious 
denominational types are represented and the mean value for the Herfindahl Index within a 5-
mile radius is .46, which is about halfway on the scale from perfect competition (0) to a perfect 
monopoly (1). Within a 10-mile radius, each public school has an average of 15 private 
competitors, approximately 4 religious denominational types are represented, and the mean value 
for the Herfindahl Index is 0.40.   
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Competition Measures 
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
Distance: Miles to nearest private school competitor 4.49 1.99 5.17 0 27.88 
Competition Measures in 5 mile Radius  
 
   
Density: Number of local private schools 5.36 2 7.21 0 40 
Diversity: Number of religious denominational 
types represented 
2.10 1 2.15 0 8 
Concentration: Herfindahl Index .46 .33 .32 0 1 
Competition Measures in 10 mile Radius  
 
   
Density: Number of local private schools 15.33 8 18.64 0 79 
Diversity: Number of religious denominational 
types represented 
3.76 3 3.02 0 11 
Concentration: Herfindahl Index .40 .25 .30 0 1 
Note: Authors’ calculations 
Source: Data from the National Center for Education Statistics, Common Core of Data (CCD), "Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey", 2010-11and Private School Universe Survey, 2009-10 
 
We also plot kernel densities of each of the competition measures to show variation in the 
measures by radius, summarized in Figure 4. The top left panel shows the distance to nearest 
private school competitor, with the majority of values concentrated around the 2 mile marker. 
The top right panel of Figure 4, meanwhile, shows how the number of neighboring private 
schools varies by radius, with a higher proportion of zeroes occurring within the 5-mile radius. 
The bottom left panel of Figure 4 shows the distribution of private school diversity, measured by 
the number of different religious denominational types represented within a given radius. As we 
might expect, this number increases in the larger radius, attaining a maximum value of 11. 
Finally, the bottom right panel of Figure 4 shows the distribution of private school density, 
measured using a modified Herfindahl Index. Both radii show a concentration of values around 
.2, which indicates a strongly competitive environment. Taken together, these kernel densities 
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suggest that Indiana public schools would have experienced a significant competitive shock with 
the announcement of the ICSP.  
   
     
7
7
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of Competition Variables, by Radius. 
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B. Model. A school fixed effects model is employed to estimate the effect of private 
school competition on public school performance, building upon the model estimated by Figlio 
and Hart (2014).  
                            
Where Yst is the average standardized math or reading score for school s in year t; αs is a school 
fixed effect; Cs is the measure of pre-policy competitive pressure facing school s; Pt is an 
indicator variable identifying the post-policy year, 2011-12; Sst is a vector of time-varying school 
characteristics (shares of students of each race and gender and the share eligible for free/reduced 
lunch); and Tt is a set of dummy variables indicating year. The β coefficient on the two-way-
interaction of competition measures and post-policy year indicator is the parameter of interest. 
Standard errors are clustered at the school level.  
 
Results 
The results of the ICSP competition analysis are reported in Table 3. Each cell represents 
the coefficient on the two-way interaction between the competition measure and post-policy 
year. Regressions are run separately for each of the four competition measures. The coefficients 
on the competition variables are multiplied by 100 to assist the reader in differentiating between 
small differences in effect sizes. The left panel of Table 3 displays the results within a 10 mile 
radius whereas the right panel displays the results within a 5 mile radius. As discussed 
previously, models using the concentration measure must exclude those public schools not 
matched to a single private school. This explains the decreased sample size in these models.  
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Table 3 
School Fixed Effects Regression Estimates of the First Year Impacts of ICSP Competition on Public School Achievement 
 10 Mile Radius  5 Mile Radius 
 Distance 
(r) 
Density Diversity Concentration 
(r) 
 Distance 
(r) 
Density Diversity Concentration 
(r) 
ELA .07 
(.08) 
-.02 
(.02) 
.17 
(.14) 
4.01*** 
(1.47) 
 .07 
(.08) 
.04 
(.06) 
.38** 
(.19) 
4.95*** 
(1.67) 
Observations 5,615 5,615 5,615 4,731  5,615 5,615 5,615 3,799 
Unique Schools 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,183  1,404 1,404 1,404 950 
Adj. R-Squared 0.90 0.90 0.90 0.91  0.90 0.90 0.90 0.92 
          
Math .13 
(.10) 
-.03 
(.03) 
-.01 
(.18) 
.56 
(1.83) 
 .13 
(.10) 
-.03 
(.07) 
-.04 
(.24) 
.75 
(1.95) 
Observations 5,615 5,615 5,615 4,731  5,615 5,615 5,615 3,799 
Unique Schools 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,183  1,404 1,404 1,404 950 
Adj. R-Squared 0.86 0.86 0.86 0.87   0.86 0.86 0.86 0.89 
Note: The dependent variable is the school average 2011-12 standardized math or English Language Arts score; Standard errors clustered by school in 
parentheses; Variables followed by (r) are reverse coded to ease interpretation; Each cell represents the coefficient estimate on the interaction between the 
competition measure and a post-policy indicator from a separate regression model. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for interpretability. Controls include 
indicators percent of student body eligible for subsidized lunch, percent of each race, percent male, as well as school and year fixed effects; *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.1  
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As can be seen in Table 3, none of the four competition measures is significantly related 
to student math performance in either radius examined. In English Language Arts, meanwhile, 
half of the measures in a 5-mile radius are positively and significantly related to student 
achievement. For instance, each additional type of private school within a 5-mile radius is 
associated with an increase in ELA achievement of .0038 of a standard deviation (SD).  This 
positive and significant effect does not hold when we extend the radius to 10-miles, however. In 
fact, only one measure provides consistent evidence of a significant competitive effect- the 
concentration measure, which uses a modified Herfindahl Index. A one-unit increase in the 
concentration measure within a 5-mile radius is associated with a .0495 SD increase in ELA 
achievement. Extending the radius to a 10-mile zone, this concentration measure decreases in 
magnitude but remains statistically significant. Within a 10-mile radius, a one-unit increase in 
the concentration measure is associated with a .0401 SD increase in ELA achievement.  
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Table 4 
School Fixed Effects Regression Estimates  of the First Year Impacts of ICSP Competition on Public School Achievement, 
Controlling for Lagged Achievement  
 10 Mile Radius  5 Mile Radius 
 Distance 
(r) 
Density Diversity Concentration 
(r) 
 Distance 
(r) 
Density Diversity Concentration 
(r) 
ELA .04 
(.08) 
-.01 
(.02) 
.21 
(.14) 
3.53** 
(1.48) 
 .04 
(.08) 
.05 
(.06) 
.37** 
(.19) 
3.95** 
(1.63) 
Observations 4,211 4,211 4,211 3,548  4,211 4,211 4,211 2,849 
Unique Schools 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,183  1,404 1,404 1,404 950 
Adj. R-Squared 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92  0.91 0.91 0.91 0.92 
          
Math .14 
(.10) 
.01 
(.03) 
.22 
(.18) 
1.96 
(1.84) 
 .14 
(.10) 
.05 
(.07) 
.20 
(.25) 
1.32 
(1.90) 
Observations 4,211 4,211 4,211 3,548  4,211 4,211 4,211 2,849 
Unique Schools 1,404 1,404 1,404 1,183  1,404 1,404 1,404 950 
Adj. R-Squared 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89   0.88 0.88 0.88 0.90 
Note: The dependent variable is the school average 2011-12 standardized math or English Language Arts score; Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
Variables followed by (r) are reverse coded to ease interpretation; ; Each cell represents the coefficient estimate on the interaction between the competition 
measure and a post-policy indicator from a separate regression model. Coefficients are multiplied by 100 for interpretability. Controls include indicators 
percent of student body eligible for subsidized lunch, percent of each race, percent male, school fixed effects and lagged achievement; *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1  
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Table 4 displays results from a model that also includes a lagged achievement variable, 
which reduces the sample size but improves the model fit (the adjusted R-squared values 
uniformly increase when we include lagged achievement). As we saw in Table 3, none of the 
four competition measures is significantly related to student math performance in either radius 
examined. In English Language Arts, on the other hand, half of the measures in a 5-mile radius 
are positively and significantly related to student achievement. Each additional type of private 
school within a 5-mile radius is associated with an increase in ELA achievement of .0037 SD. As 
we saw in Table 3, however, this positive and significant effect does not hold when we extend 
the radius to 10 miles. Once again, only one measure provides consistent evidence of a 
significant competitive effect- the concentration measure. A one-unit increase in the 
concentration measure within a 5-mile radius is associated with a .0395 SD increase in ELA 
achievement. Within a 10-mile radius, this concentration measure is associated with a .0353 SD 
increase in ELA achievement.  
 
Discussion  
Although the competition measures employed in this analysis are highly similar to each 
other and draw upon similar geographic information, we have reported results using all four 
measures in order to test the stability of our results. If all four measures had found consistent 
results, this would demonstrate that any significant findings are not spurious and help lend 
confidence to our interpretation of the results. Unfortunately, this is not the case. The results 
presented in this article provide only weak and inconsistent evidence of a positive competitive 
response to the first year of the ICSP. None of the measures show any relationship with school-
average, standardized math achievement. At the same time, three out of eight results provide 
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evidence of a statistically significant, positive impact of competition on school-average 
standardized ELA achievement, which is more than we would expect to find by mere chance but 
not an especially robust result.  
The primary contribution of this study is that it addresses a common criticism of private 
school choice programs generally, which is that they destabilize traditional public schools in a 
way that causes significant harm to public school students’ academic outcomes, especially in 
areas where competition from choice programs is high. The results presented here are entirely 
inconsistent with that hypothesis, providing no evidence that competition from private school 
choice programs decreases student achievement in public schools.   
There is an important caveat to note, however, when interpreting these results. Our 
estimated effects could be underestimated if the ICSP hadn’t had enough time to become 
sufficiently well established after just a single year to generate the type of competitive pressure 
that might prompt a clearer public school response. This explanation is plausible, considering 
that the program only enrolled around 4,000 students during that first year of operation. Further, 
the lawsuit filed against the program just months before the ICSP officially began sought a 
preliminary injunction to block the ICSP and may have affected school administrators’ 
perceptions of the permanency of the program, diluting any potential competitive pressure by 
giving the impression that the program could be quickly halted. For these reasons, it will be 
important to continue studying the systemic impacts of the ICSP as later years of data become 
available. 
 
Conclusion 
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This article presents an analysis of the competitive impacts of the Indiana Choice 
Scholarship Program, a statewide school voucher program with the potential to grow into the 
national’s largest school voucher program. By using variation in private school penetration 
across the state of Indiana and taking advantage of a policy shock occurring in school year 2011-
12, we are able to test for changes in average public school performance in Math and English 
Language Arts with a school fixed effects model.   
Overall, the results presented here provide only weak evidence of a positive competitive 
response to the first year of the ICSP. In math, none of the four competition measures are 
significantly related to school-average performance whereas in English Language Arts, three out 
of eight results provide evidence of a statistically significant, positive competitive effect. 
Depending on the radius selected, a one-unit increase in the concentration measure (a modified 
Herfindahl Index) is associated with a .04 to .05 SD increase in school-average ELA 
achievement.  
Given that the impact of the choice program is not consistently detectable in school-
average outcomes, we must conclude that the competitive threat of the ICSP in its first year of 
operation was modest to negligible and that traditional public schools did not respond in a 
manner that can be clearly captured by changes in school-average test scores.  We can conclude 
with confidence, however, that competition from private school choice programs has not 
decreased student achievement in Indiana’s public schools.     
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The Impact of Targeted School Vouchers on Racial Stratification in Louisiana Schools 
By: Anna Jacob, Jonathan N. Mills, and Patrick J. Wolf 
 
Abstract 
This article analyzes the racial stratification impacts of the Louisiana Scholarship 
Program (LSP), a statewide school voucher program that has provided public funds for low-
income, mostly minority students in low-performing public schools to enroll in participating 
private schools since the fall of 2012. We use a student-level panel data set to track individuals 
as they switch schools in order to measure the impact of the LSP on racial stratification in both 
public and private schools across the state of Louisiana. In general, our analysis indicates that 
LSP transfers have reduced racial stratification in the voucher students’ former public schools, 
but have marginally increased stratification in the private schools. Eighty-two percent of all 
student transfers reduce racial stratification in traditional public schools that students depart 
when they participate in the voucher program. On the other hand, transfers by voucher students 
reduce school-level racial stratification just 45% of the time in participating LSP private schools. 
When we restrict the sample to include only the districts under active federal desegregation 
orders, the large reduction in traditional public schools’ stratification levels holds whereas there 
is no impact on private schools.   
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The Impact of Targeted School Vouchers on Racial Stratification in Louisiana Schools 
 
The Louisiana Scholarship Program (LSP) is a statewide school choice program that 
provides public funds for low-income students in under-performing public schools to enroll in 
participating private schools. Initially piloted in New Orleans in 2008, Act 2 of the 2012 Regular 
Session expanded the LSP statewide, allowing thousands of public school students to transfer out 
of their residentially-assigned public schools and into private schools of their choosing. In school 
year 2012-13, almost 10,000 eligible Louisiana students applied for an LSP voucher. Ultimately 
approximately 5,000 students from low-performing public schools used these vouchers to enroll 
in private schools. All of these students were low-income and 80 percent were African 
American. LSP vouchers covered students’ school tuition costs at 117 private, mostly Catholic, 
schools in the program’s first year. 
This article examines how transfers by LSP voucher users have impacted racial 
stratification in public and private schools in Louisiana in the first year of the expanded program. 
Critics of school choice programs have typically raised the concern that such programs can harm 
desegregation efforts by allowing students to transfer out of their assigned public schools and 
into private schools that are stratified by race/ ethnicity (Berliner, Farrell, Huerta, & Mickelson, 
2000; Cobb & Glass, 1999; Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, & Wang, 2010). Such concerns are 
particularly relevant in Louisiana, a state with a history of state-sponsored segregation. The 
decades since the 1954 Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas decision have seen a 
significant level of judicial oversight of school desegregation efforts nationally. In Louisiana, the 
1975 Brumfield v. Dodd case signaled the end of public financial support for private schools that 
segregate or discriminate in admissions by declaring such schools ineligible for state assistance 
of any kind. This includes funding for textbooks, school supplies, student transportation, or 
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classroom materials. Today, the federal government continues to monitor schools to ensure their 
compliance with desegregation plans. The United States remains a party to desegregation suits in 
24 Louisiana school districts. Additionally, any districts not under court orders can submit 
voluntary desegregation plans known as Form 441-b plans for their schools to the U.S. 
Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.  
In August 2013, the U.S. Justice Department filed a motion in the Brumfield v. Dodd 
lawsuit, seeking an injunction against the LSP and alleging that the program increases racial 
segregation. After several months of negotiations between the State of Louisiana and the DOJ, 
the U.S. District Court issued a decree that the state must provide the federal government with 
information on LSP applicants, including student race, at least 10 days before scholarships are 
awarded.  
Given the ongoing efforts to reduce stratification in Louisiana’s public schools as well as 
the legal attention surrounding this issue, it is important to understand how the LSP affects racial 
stratification. In this study, we empirically examine the issue using data on LSP voucher users. 
By tracking individual students across time as they move from the public to private sector, we 
can determine if these transfers increased or reduced racial stratification at students’ former 
public schools (sending schools) and current private schools (receiving schools) by nudging the 
school’s racial composition nearer or further from the racial composition of the broader 
community.  
In general our analysis indicates that access to additional educational choices for low-
income students has not increased racial stratification in public schools in Louisiana, a welcome 
outcome for a state with a history of state-sponsored segregation. Specifically, we find that LSP 
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voucher users have overwhelmingly reduced racial stratification in traditional public schools. 
Findings for private schools, however, suggest that just 45% of transfers reduce racial 
stratification. The results of this analysis provide reliable empirical evidence that can be used to 
inform ongoing debates both inside and outside of the courtroom over whether or not parental 
choice is harming current desegregation efforts in Louisiana’s public schools. 
The remainder of this article proceeds as follows. First, we provide a summary of the 
literature examining the integration impacts of school choice programs. In the next section, we 
describe the data used in our analysis and describe our empirical methodology. The following 
section presents the results. Finally, we conclude with a summary of the findings and a 
discussion of the implications for public policy.  
 
Previous Literature 
There is a relatively large literature examining the racial integration impacts of school 
choice programs, which can be broadly divided into four categories based on the methods 
employed: (1) descriptive comparisons of choice users and eligible non-users; (2) cross-sectional 
analyses of school racial composition compared across the public and private school sectors; (3) 
student transfer measures with no racial composition benchmark; and (4) student transfer 
measures with a racial composition benchmark. Studies using the fourth method provide the 
most accurate representation of the impacts of school choice programs on racial stratification and 
have generally found encouraging results. 
1. Descriptive comparisons of choice users and eligible non-users. Early studies of 
school choice programs rely on cross sectional data to generate simple descriptive comparisons 
of choosers and eligible non-choosers but fail to examine existing levels of school-level racial 
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stratification. Without documenting stratification levels in schools prior to the commencement 
of a choice program or tracking progress towards a community benchmark of desired racial 
diversity, there is no way to judge the relative harm or benefits of student transfers under a 
given choice program. For example, Henig (1996) notes that minorities were less likely to 
participate in a magnet school program in Maryland and that white transfer requests were for 
schools with high proportions of other white students in the student body. This leads Henig to 
claim that “choice may exacerbate, rather than ameliorate, racial segregation” (p.105). Willms 
& Echols (1993) use a similar approach to study a school choice program in Scotland, finding 
that parents whose children had exercised the school choice option were more likely to have a 
prestigious occupation and to have attained a higher level of education. Unfortunately, while 
these measures help describe the types of students who actually access a given program, they do 
not capture impacts on racial stratification because they fail to examine school-level 
stratification before and after the program takes effect.  
2. Cross-sectional analyses of school racial composition. Studies in the second 
category also use measures that are cross-sectional in nature but use either the district or core-
based statistical area (CBSA) as the racial composition benchmark against which to judge 
relative levels of racial stratification.  
Within-district studies rely on established residential segregation indices in an attempt to 
model cross-sector differences in integration.  With these measures, the standard against which 
all schools are judged is the racial composition of the district.  For example, measures like the 
dissimilarity index (Burgess, Wilson, & Lupton, 2005; Clotfelter, 1999) and exposure index 
(Frankenberg & Lee, 2002; Garcia, 2008), which were originally developed to capture 
geographic segregation, have been used to describe racial dispersion patterns within a school 
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system. While these measures are intuitively appealing given their background in residential 
segregation analyses, their focus on strictly within-district comparisons fails to account for 
existing segregation across school districts (Greene, 2005). This is particularly troubling given 
the available evidence that school districts themselves tend to be quite segregated (Clotfelter, 
1999). The school district simply cannot provide an objective standard against which to judge 
school-level integration. District boundaries represent political boundaries and there is a strong 
likelihood that families may make racially-motivated decisions about which side of those 
boundaries to live on, resulting in racially homogeneous district populations that are 
unrepresentative of the racial composition of the broader community. For example, a within-
district measure would classify a public school that is 100% white in a school district that is 
100% white as being perfectly integrated, even if it is adjacent to a district that is 100% African 
American. In fact, adopting the district as the desired benchmark and actively working to imitate 
that level of integration would only exacerbate school-level segregation. Instead, we must 
choose an objective standard that can serve as the normative benchmark and hold public and 
private schools to that same benchmark. This is especially true in Louisiana where the LSP 
actively allows students to transcend district boundaries.
7
  
At least four studies in the second category have used the CBSA to act as a benchmark of 
the desired racial composition, arguing that it provides a reasonable proxy for the geographical 
area from which a school could reasonably be expected to draw students in the absence of legal 
or political boundaries. Forster uses this approach to compare public and private schools in 
Cleveland (2006a) and Milwaukee (2006b), finding that private schools participating in the 
Cleveland and Milwaukee voucher programs were less segregated, on average, than neighboring 
                                                 
7
 Twenty-four percent of voucher users actually crossed their district boundary to attend a private 
school through the program in its first year. 
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public schools. The magnitude of this difference was about 18 percentage points in Cleveland 
and 13 points in Milwaukee. Greene, Mills, and Buck (2010) also use this approach in their study 
of segregation in Milwaukee, WI. They find that, in some years, the voucher program schools 
better approximate the metro area and in other years the public schools better approximate this 
value. Importantly, over a three-year period from 2006-07 through 2008-09, neither sector comes 
close to approximating the percentage of white students in the metro area. On average, both 
sectors differ from this target value by more than 40 percentage points. Greene and Winters 
(2007) also employ this approach in their analysis of the effects of the Washington D.C voucher 
program, finding that neither the public nor private sector is particularly well integrated. They 
compute an enrollment- weighted average difference from the percentage of white students in the 
surrounding metropolitan area and show that private choice schools have a lower difference at 
33.8%, compared to 39.5% for public schools. 
3. Transfer measures with no racial composition benchmark. The third category of 
studies improves upon prior work in this area by using dynamic information on individual 
student transfers to estimate the overall impact of school choice programs on racial stratification. 
For instance, Zimmer, Gill, Booker, Lavertu, Sass, and Witte (2009) take advantage of a panel 
dataset to measure charter school segregation across seven locations. They calculate the 
difference in the proportion of students of each race in the charter school a student switches into 
and the prior traditional public school the student attended. In the majority of cases, they show 
that students tend to transfer into schools that do not differ significantly in terms of racial 
makeup from the schools they left. Without using any racial composition benchmark, however, 
this approach to measuring integration can only assert that the two schooling environments are 
98 
 
 
different (or the same), but can’t make a normative judgment about whether that change has 
helped to improve racial integration or not.  
4. Transfer measures with a racial composition benchmark. The final category of 
studies take advantage of panel data to track individual students’ migration patterns as they 
transfer between schools, judging whether these transfers help or hinder integration by whether 
they move a school towards or away from the racial diversity of some benchmark— eg. the 
district or the surrounding metropolitan or micropolitan area. Our study of the impact of the LSP 
on racial stratification in Louisiana’s public and private schools belongs in this category. 
Bifulco and Ladd (2006) analyze changes in the racial isolation experienced by third 
through eighth grade students who transfer to charter schools in North Carolina between 1996-97 
and 2001-02. Schools in which the proportion of Black students is greater than 20 percentage 
points away from the district average are classified as “racially unbalanced.” The authors then 
compare the proportion of students in each sector who attend a racially unbalanced school, 
finding that charter school students are approximately two and a half times more likely to attend 
one of these schools. 
Instead of the school district, a small number of panel studies have used the surrounding 
metropolitan or micropolitan area as the benchmark for the broader community (Greene, Mills & 
Buck, 2010; Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, & Bowen, 2012). These CBSAs are characterized by high 
degrees of social and economic interdependence and provide an appropriate racial composition 
benchmark against which to judge progress. Thus far, this approach has only been taken in two 
studies, one study examining racial integration in Milwaukee, WI and the other in Little Rock, 
AR. 
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Greene, Mills, and Buck (2010) track student transfer effects on both sending and 
receiving schools in Milwaukee, WI. They show that in 2007-08, 92% of departing students 
tended to be a member of a racial/ethnic group that was overrepresented at their originating 
school, relative to the metro area. The departure of these students positively impacted racial 
integration efforts. The comparable statistic for 2008-09 is 95%. On the other hand, when they 
analyze the impact of student transfers on receiving schools, the reverse is true. In 2007-08, 91% 
of student transfers reduced integration in the receiving schools. The comparable statistic for 
2008-09 is 94%. 
Finally, Ritter et al. (2012) analyze the effects of charter school transfers in Little Rock, 
AR between 2004-05 and 2009-10. They show that white student transfers in this time period 
improved racial integration in the sending schools twice as often as they reduced it (25% 
compared to 12%). For minority students, student transfers improved racial integration in the 
schools they left more than three times as often as reducing it (48% compared to 15%).  Impacts 
on receiving schools are not computed.  
As this review of the literature reveals, a panel study of student migratory patterns 
brought about by the introduction of a school voucher program has never been conducted across 
an entire state. Given the increasing prevalence of large-scale school voucher programs like the 
LSP, this article provides a timely analysis of a potentially serious unintended consequence of 
large-scale school choice programs.   
 
Data 
The data used in our analysis come from five sources. First, we use unique data obtained 
from the Louisiana Department of Education on LSP voucher users to track individual-level 
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school transfers. Data on private school racial compositions come from the Private School 
Universe Survey (PSS), a biennial survey conducted by the National Center for Education 
Statistics (NCES). In particular, our analysis relies on school-level data collected in the 2011-12 
school year; the year before the voucher program expanded statewide. We collected 
corresponding data on public schools in the 2011-12 school year from the NCES’s Public 
Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey. In the case of any missing data in either of these 
sources, we supplement with data from earlier versions of these same surveys. We rely on 5-year 
population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau’s American Community Survey to 
approximate the school-age racial composition of Louisiana’s Core Based Statistical Areas 
(CBSAs) in 2011-12. Finally, we identify public school districts under federal desegregation 
orders using information from the Justice Department lawsuit filed in August 2013. 
Sample selection. Figure 1 describes how we generate the sample for our primary 
analysis. Starting with a student-level data set that includes all 9,831 eligible applicants for the 
LSP in its first year of statewide operation, we first narrow the sample to include only the 5,777 
voucher winners identified in our data. Because all voucher winners didn’t necessarily use their 
voucher, the next screen reduces the sample to 4,941 students. The third screen only keeps those 
voucher users who were not participants in the New Orleans pilot program because those 
students often enroll in the same school as the previous year, and therefore their inclusion would 
merely contaminate our results. This screen reduces the sample to 3,338 students. The fourth 
screen excludes those students who were missing a prior school identification code. This 
includes students entering Kindergarten, for instance, or students moving to Louisiana from out 
of state. This brings the sample to 2,179 students. Fifth, those students who reside in rural areas 
that do not fall in a metropolitan or micropolitan area have to be excluded from our sample 
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because we are unable to calculate the racial composition of the surrounding CBSA to use as the 
integration benchmark for them. This brings the sample to 2,117. Finally, because our analysis, 
and the legal and policy debate surrounding the issue is focused on the integration impacts on 
traditional public schools, we exclude those students who previously attended a public charter 
school. Once this set of screening rules is employed, our final analysis sample consists of 1,741 
students.  
 
 
Figure 1. Creation of Student Sample for Primary Analysis of LSP Transfers 
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Descriptive statistics of students. While the primary analysis examines the effects of all 
LSP transfers that qualify for our sample, we also identify a subsample of students who are in a 
traditional public school district that is under an active federal desegregation order. Table 1 
presents descriptive statistics for both the primary analysis sample and the desegregation district 
subsample. There is an approximately even male/female split in both samples. African American 
students represent an overwhelming majority of LSP voucher users across both samples. Finally, 
the majority of observations come from the elementary grades of 1 through 5.  
 
Table 1.  
Descriptive Statistics for Analysis Sample and Subsample of Students in Desegregation Districts 
 Analysis Sample Desegregation District 
Subsample 
 (1) (2) 
  N % N % 
Count 1,741 100% 493 100% 
Male 839 48% 238 48% 
Race/Ethnicity     
African American 1,395 80% 367 74% 
Hispanic 75 4% 13 3% 
White 218 13% 93 19% 
Other 53 3% 20 4% 
Grade     
Grades 1-5 1,070 61% 313 63% 
Grades 6-8 436 25% 119 24% 
Grades 9-12 235 13% 61 12% 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The desegregation districts subsample is composed of public schools in the 34 public school districts that are 
currently under desegregation orders
 
(see Table A1 in the appendix for a full list) 
 
Descriptive statistics of schools. In order to provide context for this study, we also 
present descriptive statistics of public and private schools in Louisiana at baseline using two 
widely-used segregation measures. The first measure is the segregation index, which is computed 
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by calculating the absolute value of the difference between each school’s percentage of minority 
students from the percentage of minorities in the school-aged population of the broader 
community (the CBSA). We then use these school-level figures to generate a sector-specific, 
enrollment-weighted, average distance from the community average.  
Table 2 examines the existing differences in school-level segregation across both the 
public and private school environments using the segregation index. When comparing public 
schools to private schools on this measure, we find that both sectors are segregated and that the 
private schools are slightly more segregated, on average, than the public schools. Private schools 
are 27.9 percentage points from the community average racial demographic, whereas public 
schools are 25.5 percentage points from the community average. We can also break out the data 
to compare private and public schools within CBSA classifications — metro and micro areas. 
While we observe no statistically significant differences between sectors in metropolitan areas, 
private schools are significantly more segregated than public schools in micropolitan areas, with 
a difference of about 6 percentage points between the two sectors.   
 
Table 2.  
Enrollment-Weighted Average Distance from the Percentage Minority of the CBSA, by sector 
  Private Schools Public Schools Comparison  
  n 
Distance from 
CBSA 
n 
Distance from 
CBSA 
Difference p-value 
TOTAL 332 27.92 1,278 25.46 2.46*** .01 
Metro Areas 282 28.32 953 27.06 1.25 .24 
Micro Areas 50 25.40 325 19.75 5.65*** .01 
Source: Authors’ calculations using private school data from the Private School Universe Survey, 2011-12 and 
public school data from the Common Core of Data’s "Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey", 2011-
12; CBSA values from the 5-year American Community Survey estimates, 2008 through 2012 
Note. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. Distance from the CBSA is an absolute value. 
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We also use a second segregation measure to assess the private and public school context 
before the LSP was expanded. Frankenberg, Siegel-Hawley, and Wang (2010) suggest that 
schools where 90% or more of the population belongs to the same race/ethnicity are “hyper-
segregated”; thus, we create the homogeneity index. This is a binary measure that takes on a 
value of 1 if 90% of a school’s population belongs to the same race/ethnicity and 0 otherwise.  
Table 3 examines the prevalence of school-level racial homogeneity across sectors at baseline. 
Private schools are significantly less likely to be racially homogeneous, as judged by this 
measure. Just 14 % of private schools are identified as racially homogeneous, compared to 26% 
of public schools, a difference that is highly statistically significant. In addition, when we 
provide separate comparisons by CBSA classification, we see that private schools in 
metropolitan areas are, once again, significantly less likely to be identified as racially 
homogenous than public schools – 14% compared to 29%. In micro areas, where there are far 
fewer schools, there is no difference between the two sectors in terms of the proportion of 
racially homogeneous schools. 
 
Table 3.  
Percentage of Schools that are Racially Homogeneous, by Sector and CBSA Type 
  Private Schools Public Schools Comparison 
  n 
Percent 
Racially 
Homogeneous 
n 
Percent 
Racially 
Homogeneous 
Difference p-value 
TOTAL 332 .14 1,278 .26 -.12*** 0.00 
Metro Areas 282 .14 953 .29 -.15*** 0.00 
Micro Areas 50 .16 325 .18 .02 0.79 
Source: Authors’ calculations using private school data from the Private School Universe Survey, 2011-12 and 
public school data from the Common Core of Data’s "Public Elementary/Secondary School Universe Survey", 2011-
12; CBSA values from the 5-year American Community Survey estimates, 2008 through 2012 
Note. *** indicates significance at the 1% level;  
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The school-level descriptive statistics presented here reveal that both public and private 
schools in Louisiana are segregated. Students in private schools are significantly more likely to 
attend a school whose percentage of minority students is lower than that of the surrounding 
metropolitan area. Students in public schools, meanwhile, are more likely to be enrolled in 
schooling environments where 90% or more of a school’s population belongs to the same race or 
ethnicity.  Given that 80% of voucher users in the first year of the program were African 
American, this suggests that the desegregating potential of the voucher program is high. By using 
a state-funded voucher, African American LSP voucher users are accessing private schools that, 
up to this point, have had a low representation of minority students.  
In the next section, we present the results of our analysis of transfers brought about by the 
LSP, which explicitly models the direct effects of the program on racial stratification.  
 
Research Design 
While the previous section provided a general overview of the racial makeup of 
Louisiana’s schools before the LSP expanded statewide, we turn now to an analysis of how the 
LSP changes racial stratification levels within these schools. We first define a benchmark 
representing the racial composition goal a school could reasonably achieve given the broader 
community. Without such a benchmark, we would have no standard against which to judge 
progress. For our analysis, we use as our benchmark the racial composition of the CBSA, as 
defined by the U.S. Census Bureau.
8
 In total, 25 CBSAs are represented in our sample. The 
                                                 
8
 Core based statistical areas (CBSA) are defined by the U.S. Census Bureau; and are broken into 
two types. Metropolitian statistical areas represent geographical areas with populations of at least 
50,000. Micropolitian statistical areas contain populations of between 10,000 and 50,000. By 
restricting our analysis to CBSAs, we exclude 62 students from our sample who live in rural 
counties that fall outside of metropolitan or micropolitan areas. 
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percentage of the school-age population that is white in these areas ranges from 26 percent to 78 
percent, with a mean value of 56 percent. The largest CBSA is the New Orleans-Metairie-Kenner 
metro area, which has a population of approximately 226,000. The median population for a 
CBSA in our sample is 13,047.  
Having defined the CBSA as our community benchmark, we can now answer our 
primary research question, “Have LSP transfers reduced or increased racial stratification in 
sending and receiving schools?” We identify student transfers that move a school’s racial 
composition closer to the racial composition of the relevant CBSA as stratification-reducing 
transfers, while transfers that move a school’s racial composition further from this benchmark 
are identified as stratification-increasing transfers. For example, if an African American student 
leaves a public school in which African Americans are over-represented relative to the broader 
community, we would identify this transfer as stratification-reducing. On the other hand, if the 
school has a lower percentage of African American students than the broader community, that 
transfer is counted as contributing to the increased racial stratification of the sending school. In 
cases, where an African American student leaves a school that is 100% African American, this 
transfer is neither coded as stratification-reducing or stratification-increasing as it is considered a 
null impact. The same logic is applied to the analysis of the transfers of students who are white 
or Hispanic. This measure takes an intuitive approach to studying the racial stratification effects 
of a school choice policy and has been previously used by Greene, Mills, & Buck (2010), Jensen 
& Ritter (2009, 2010), and Ritter, Jensen, Kisida, & Bowen (2012).  
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Results 
Using student-level panel data, we document all LSP-related transfers and record the 
impact of the moves on school-level racial stratification. Figure 2 summarizes our primary 
analysis of the effects of LSP transfers on racial stratification in both sending and receiving 
schools. For sending schools, we identify transfers as “stratification-reducing” when a student of 
a given race leaves a school that is disproportionally composed of students of his same race 
relative to the greater CBSA. Conversely, outcomes that increase racial stratification occur when 
a student leaves an “integrated” school in which the proportion of his race is less than the 
proportion of individuals of that race in the greater CBSA. As indicated in figure 2, the 
overwhelming majority—82%—of LSP student transfers reduced racial stratification in sending 
schools. Meanwhile, less than a fifth of transfers increased racial stratification in the former 
public schools of LSP students. 
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 Figure 2. Impacts of Voucher Transfers on Racial Stratification. Sending schools are traditional 
public schools only- excludes private New Orleans schools that were already participating in the 
voucher program and charter schools. Impacts on receiving schools are based on student 
transfers from traditional public schools only. Transfers from sending schools come close (1,684) 
but don't completely sum to the size of the full analysis sample (1,741) because this figure only 
examines transfers for the three largest racial categories. The numbers of transfers from sending 
and into receiving schools don't match because a small number of private schools don’t appear in 
the Private School Universe Study, which is a voluntary NCES survey. Number of transfers 
excluded because sending school was 100% same race = 4 (Black), 0 (Hispanic), and 0 (White). 
Number of transfers excluded because receiving school was 100% same race = 32 (Black), 0 
(Hispanic), and 7 (White). Chi-square tests for goodness-of-fit indicate the observed differences 
are significant for sending schools (p<0.01) and significant for receiving schools (p=.0003). 
 
Racial stratification in receiving schools may be affected by student transfers too. We 
identify transfers that bring the school’s racial proportions closer in line with those of the greater 
CBSA as reducing racial stratification and those transfers that bring the racial proportions further 
from those of the greater CBSA as increasing racial stratification. As Figure 2 shows, LSP 
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transfers result in slightly more negative outcomes for receiving schools: 803 student transfers 
increase racial stratification compared to 665 transfers that reduce stratification, a difference that 
is statistically significant. Thus, while our analysis indicates large positive impacts of the LSP 
vouchers for traditional public schools, the effect on private receiving schools is small and 
negative. 
In Table 4, we examine transfer impacts for three major student subgroups – White, 
African American, and Hispanic. Given that 80% of voucher users are African American, it is 
unsurprising that the majority of student transfers are for African American students. Within this 
group, 92% of transfers reduce stratification at the sending school, compared to 24% of white 
student transfers and 56% of Hispanic student transfers. In receiving schools, 45% of African 
American student transfers reduce stratification, compared to 28% for white students and 96% 
for Hispanic students.   
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Table 4.  
Impact on Racial Stratification in Sending and Receiving Schools across the state of Louisiana 
 Sending Receiving 
Type of Transfer N % N % 
African American Students     
Reduce Stratification 1,286 92 542 45 
Increase Stratification  105 8 659 55 
White Students     
Reduce Stratification 53 24 56 28 
Increase Stratification  165 76 141 72 
Hispanic Students      
Reduce Stratification 42 56 67 96 
Increase Stratification  33 44 3 4 
Percent of overall transfers that 
reduce racial stratification  
82% 
 
45% 
Note: Sending schools are traditional public schools only- excludes private New Orleans schools that were already 
participating in the voucher program and charter schools. Impacts on receiving schools are based on student 
transfers from traditional public schools only. Transfers from sending schools don't sum to the size of the full 
analysis sample (1,741) because this table only examines transfers for the three largest racial categories. The 
numbers of transfers from sending and into receiving schools don't match because a small number of private schools 
don't appear in the Private School Universe Study, which is a voluntary NCES survey. Number of transfers excluded 
because sending school was 100% same race = 4 (Black), 0 (Hispanic), and 0 (White). Number of transfers excluded 
because receiving school was 100% same race = 32 (Black), 0 (Hispanic), and 7 (White). Chi-square tests for 
goodness-of-fit indicate the observed differences are significant for sending schools (p<0.01) and significant for 
receiving schools (p=.0003). 
 
Subgroup Analysis 
While the prior analysis focused on LSP transfers in general, it is also relevant to 
examine how these transfers are differentially impacting public schools in districts under federal 
desegregation orders. In particular, we can examine this question by restricting the primary 
analysis to LSP schools in the 34 public school districts that are currently under desegregation 
orders.
9
 When we restrict our analysis to this subgroup, we find that, once again, transfers 
significantly reduce stratification in sending schools and have null impacts on receiving schools. 
                                                 
9
 See Table A1 in the appendix for the list of school districts under federal desegregation orders 
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As Figure 3 shows, 354 LSP transfers (75% of all transfers) reduce stratification in the sending 
schools. In receiving schools meanwhile, there is no statistically significant difference between 
the number of stratification-reducing and stratification-increasing transfers.  
 
 
Figure 3. Impacts of Voucher Transfers on Racial Stratification in Districts under Desegregation 
Orders. Sending schools are traditional public schools under federal desegregation orders only. 
Impacts on receiving schools are based on student transfers from traditional public schools under 
federal desegregation orders. Number of transfers excluded because sending school was 100% 
same race =0 (Black), 0 (Hispanic), and 0 (White). Number of transfers excluded because 
receiving school was 100% same race =0 (Black), 0 (Hispanic), and 0 (White). Chi-square tests 
for goodness-of-fit indicate the observed differences are significant for sending schools (p<0.01) 
and insignificant for receiving schools (p=.4517). 
  
Table 5 breaks out these results by race. The same general patterns hold as before. For 
African American students, 87% of transfers reduce stratification at the sending school, 
compared to 33% of white student transfers and 38% of Hispanic student transfers. In receiving 
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schools, 57% of African American student transfers reduce stratification, compared to just 4% 
for white students and 100% for Hispanic students.  
 
Table 5.  
Impact on Racial Stratification in Schools under Federal Desegregation Orders 
 Sending Receiving 
Type of Transfer N % N % 
African American Students     
Reduce Stratification 318 87 204 57 
Increase Stratification  49 13 154 43 
White Students     
Reduce Stratification 31 33 3 4 
Increase Stratification  62 67 80 96 
Hispanic Students      
Reduce Stratification 5 38 11 100 
Increase Stratification  8 62 0 0 
Percent of overall transfers that 
reduce racial stratification  
75% 
 
48% 
Note: Sending schools are traditional public schools under federal desegregation orders only. Impacts on receiving 
schools are based on student transfers from traditional public schools under federal desegregation orders. Number of 
transfers excluded because sending school is 100% same-race is zero. Number of transfers excluded because 
receiving school is 100% same-race is zero. Chi-square tests for goodness-of-fit indicate the observed differences 
are significant for sending schools (p<0.01) and insignificant for receiving schools (p=.4517). 
 
In addition, these patterns of findings generally hold when we further restrict our analysis 
to just include the 24 districts in which the U.S. is listed as a party in the original desegregation 
cases. Specifically, LSP transfers in this subsample reduce racial stratification in sending schools 
80% of the time (p <.01) and increase racial stratification in receiving schools 66% of the time 
(p= .0248).  
The results presented here reveal large positive impacts of the LSP vouchers for 
traditional public schools, which have long been the focus of federal efforts to desegregate. 
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These positive findings hold when we restrict the sample to include only the districts under 
active federal desegregation orders and again when we further restrict the sample to those 
districts where the U.S. is a party to the suit. It is important to keep in mind, however, that 
although the effect on private receiving schools is small, it is negative and statistically significant 
in the overall sample but not significant in the samples limited to areas under desegregation 
orders.  
 
Sensitivity Test:  Choosing Between Two Potential Panel Measures 
The racial stratification measure used in this analysis uses panel data to assess the 
impacts of the LSP on racial stratification, judging the direction of impacts by comparing against 
a racial composition benchmark. Zimmer et al. (2009) also employ a panel approach to assess the 
impacts of a school choice program on racial stratification levels but compare the racial 
composition of the receiving school to that of the sending school instead of an external 
benchmark. There is one scenario in which the Zimmer et al. (2009) panel approach could be 
regarded as superior to the panel approach used here that employs a racial integration 
benchmark. That situation arises when a student leaves a public school in which his race is over-
represented for a private school in which his race is also over-represented (eg. in the case of 
“white flight”). The panel approach that uses a benchmark would rate such a move as reducing 
racial stratification for the sending school and increasing racial stratification for the receiving 
school. A transfer measure without a racial composition benchmark (eg. Zimmer et al., 2009), 
however, would assign a net rating to that move, judging it to increase racial stratification, which 
is perhaps more intuitive to many people. Because readers may disagree over which approach is 
superior and to ensure transparency regarding our choice of measure, we provide Table A2 in the 
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appendix breaking apart all potential scenarios in which a student transfer is rated as 
“stratification-reducing” in the sending school. The “white flight” example is Scenario 6, when 
the student departs a sending school in which his race is over-represented (thus, being rated as 
stratification-reducing by our panel measure) and arrives in a private school in which his race is 
even more over-represented (thus, being rated as stratification-increasing by our panel measure). 
This scenario explains only 16% of all transfers, thus reducing any concerns that the choice of 
measure is driving our results.   
 
Limitations 
 There are at least two limitations that restrict the generalizability of the methods and 
findings presented here. First, the measure employed in this paper to calculate the racial 
stratification impacts of the voucher on sending schools includes all students who depart a public 
school. Technically, it would be possible for this sample to include students who drop out of 
school or move out of the state entirely. We avoid such an error in this study by limiting the 
sample to those students who actually used an LSP voucher and, thus, arrived in a participating 
private school in the fall of 2012. Researchers seeking to imitate our methods should beware of 
this limitation of the integration measure used here and restrict their sample appropriately. 
Second, integration is measured in this paper using a binary measure that rates transfers in a 
binary fashion— as either stratification-reducing or stratification-increasing. The benefit of this 
approach is that it is easy to understand and interpret but it could be criticized for equally 
weighting a transfer from a school in which the student’s race is only slightly under-represented 
and a transfer from a school in which the student’s race is dramatically under-represented. It is 
possible that a more sophisticated measure could be employed that would weight transfers and 
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express the overall stratification impact on a continuous scale, although it is not clear how one 
would interpret the numbers produced by such a measure. 
 
Conclusion 
This article presents an analysis of the impacts of the Louisiana Scholarship Program 
(LSP) on racial stratification in Louisiana public and private schools. Overall, we find large, 
positive improvements to racial stratification in public schools that are consistent across our 
samples and small increases in racial stratification in private schools that are not consistent 
across our samples as a result of this school voucher program.  
Our primary analysis uses student-level panel data to track individual student transfers as 
they switch from the public to the private sector. Outcomes that reduce racial stratification occur 
when a student of a given race leaves a school in which his race is over-represented relative to 
the greater CBSA. Conversely, outcomes that increase racial stratification occur when a student 
leaves a school in which his race is under-represented relative to the CBSA. This analysis reveals 
that the vouchers used by the low-income, mostly minority recipients have impacted public 
school desegregation efforts in a positive manner. By leaving schools in which they were racially 
overrepresented, 82% of voucher users reduced racial stratification in Louisiana public schools, 
bringing those public school racial populations closer in line with those of the broader 
communities. Positive impacts are particularly sizeable for African American students, who 
constitute the majority of voucher recipients. Ninety-two percent of LSP transfers for African 
American students resulted in positive outcomes for sending schools in the overall transfer 
sample. At the same time, student transfers have, in general, a small, negative impact on the the 
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schools they transfer to. Just 45% of all transfers reduced racial stratification in the receiving 
schools. 
In addition, an analysis of the subgroup of students leaving districts under active federal 
desegregation orders demonstrates that transfers significantly reduce racial stratification in these 
34 public school districts, the very districts that have been the subject of the greatest segregation 
concerns. In total, 75% of transfers reduce racial stratification in the sending schools in this 
subgroup. Meanwhile, the impact on receiving schools in this subgroup is statistically equivalent 
to zero.   
While acknowledging that LSP transfers have resulted in a small, negative impact on 
private school racial stratification, the results of this study allow us to confidently conclude that 
the LSP has not reduced desegregation efforts in Louisiana public schools. To the contrary, 
public schools in Louisiana, including those public schools under active desegregation orders, 
are significantly less racially stratified as a direct result of the statewide school voucher program.  
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Appendices 
Table A1.  
Public school districts under Federal Desegregation Orders 
District Name U.S. is a Party to the 
Desegregation Order  
Avoyelles Parish YES 
Bienville Parish YES 
Bossier Parish YES 
Caddo Parish YES 
Catahoula Parish YES 
Claiborne Parish YES 
Concordia Parish YES 
Desoto Parish YES 
Franklin Parish YES 
Jackson Parish YES 
Lasalle Parish YES 
Lincoln Parish YES 
City Of Monroe School District YES 
Plaquemines Parish YES 
Pointe Coupee Parish YES 
Richland Parish YES 
Sabine Parish YES 
St. Helena Parish YES 
St. James Parish YES 
St. John The Baptist Parish YES 
St. Martin Parish YES 
St. Mary Parish YES 
St. Tammany Parish YES 
West Carroll Parish YES 
Acadia Parish NO 
Allen Parish NO 
Assumption Parish NO 
Iberia Parish NO 
Jefferson Davis Parish NO 
Lafourche Parish NO 
Madison Parish NO 
Ouachita Parish NO 
Tangipahoa Parish NO 
Winn Parish NO 
Source: United States’ Memorandum in Support of its Motion for Further Relief, Brumfield v. Dodd, Civ. A. No. 71-
1316, (p.4)  
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Table A2.  
Comparing Methodologies: Transfer Measures of Integration, With and Without a Racial 
Benchmark 
  Jacob et al. Approach:  
Using a Benchmark 
 Zimmer et al. (2009) 
Approach:  
No Benchmark 
  Impact on Sending School  Net Impact 
  Transfer 
Rating 
Count Proportion  Transfer Rating 
1. R* > R0 > R1 Bad 74 .05  Good 
2. R0 > R* >  R1 Good 536 .34  Good 
3. R0 > R1 > R* Good 504 .32  Good 
4. R* > R1 > R0 Bad 70 .04  Bad 
5. R1 > R* > R0  Bad 141 .09  Bad 
6. R1 > R0 > R* Good 255 .16  Bad 
TOTAL   1,580 1.00   
Note: R0 denotes percent of race R in sending school; R1 denotes percent of race R in receiving school; R* denotes 
benchmark. Only the subset of students who were present in the analyses of impacts on both sending and receiving 
schools are included. Scenario 6 represents the example of “white flight”- when a student leaves a public school in 
which his race is over-represented for a private school in which his race is also over-represented. 
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Conclusion 
As market-based school reforms have become an increasingly important part of the 
American educational landscape, policymakers, advocates, and a growing segment of the general 
public have expressed hope that these programs will stimulate improvements in conventional 
public schools. There are currently 39 private school choice programs in operation in 18 U.S. 
states plus the District of Columbia and Douglas County, Colorado; yet less than 1% of all public 
school students in the U.S. attend a private school through these programs. The impact of choice 
reforms is most widely felt, therefore, through second-level effects on those students who remain 
in district-run public schools. Even as growth in the number of private school choice programs 
accelerates, the vast majority of students will continue to be educated in traditional public school 
districts so there is a particular need for research that examines the impact of expanded 
educational choice on student achievement in these institutions. Furthermore, opponents of 
educational choice have raised concerns about the potential racial stratification that might occur 
as a result of such programs. This dissertation examines both of these questions in the context of 
two statewide, means-tested school voucher programs— the Indiana Choice Scholarship 
Program and the Louisiana Scholarship Program.  
 
Research Question 1: Is public school achievement influenced by competition from a 
private school choice program? 
Milton Friedman claimed that competition from school choice would lead to “the 
development and improvement of all schools” (1962, p.93). Articles one and two of this 
dissertation directly address that assertion. In Louisiana, we show that the lowest-graded 
Louisiana public schools exposed to the threat of the LSP had a modest, statistically significant 
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response to the injection of completion, with positive impacts ranging from .001 to .06 SD. 
These impacts may seem modest but it is important to recall that the voucher program only 
served approximately 5,000 students in its first year, which is less than 1% of all public school 
students in Louisiana.  
In Indiana, the evidence is slightly weaker. We employ a school fixed effects model to 
test for evidence of a competitive response to the first year of the ICSP. In math, none of the four 
competition measures are significantly related to school-average performance whereas in English 
Language Arts, three out of eight results provide evidence of a statistically significant, positive 
competitive effect, which is more than would be expected by statistical chance but not 
particularly robust. Depending on the radius selected, a one-unit increase in the concentration 
measure (a modified Herfindahl Index) is associated with a .04 to .05 SD increase in school-
average ELA achievement.  
Overall, the takeaway from these complementary studies is clear. The competitive threat 
of these voucher programs ranges from negligible to modestly positive but has certainly not 
decreased student achievement in the public schools exposed to the threat of competition.  
 
Research Question 2: How do student transfers through a private school voucher program 
impact racial stratification in Louisiana’s public and private schools? 
To promote better racial integration in America’s educational institutions, states have 
experimented with various policies since Brown v. Board of Education first ordered the 
desegregation of all U.S. public schools. The 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Title 1 of the 1965 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act, for instance, combined a heightened threat of 
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litigation with the financial incentives for elementary and secondary schools to desegregate, 
particularly in poor districts, which relied most heavily on federal grants (Cascio, Gordon, Lewis 
& Reber, 2008). Almost a decade later, the Supreme Court sanctioned the use of busing to 
achieve desegregation goals (Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg, 1971). In Louisiana in particular, 
school districts have experimented with strategies such as student reassignment, busing, facility 
upgrades for schools with large minority populations, and extensive monitoring of district 
compliance and reporting requirements to reduce racial stratification across its public schools, 
many of which operate in districts under court supervision. Article three of this dissertation 
describes a voluntary school choice program whose primary goal was not to reduce racial 
stratification in the public schools but that actually had overwhelmingly positive impacts in this 
regard. This encouraging finding is tempered, however, by the small, negative impacts we 
observe on racial stratification levels in private schools.  
Using a student-level panel data set to track individuals as they switch schools, we are 
able to measure the impact of the LSP on racial stratification in both the public and private 
schools affected by the program. Overall, we show that LSP transfers reduce racial stratification 
in the voucher students’ former public schools, but these transfers have marginally increased 
racial stratification in the private schools. Eighty-two percent of all student transfers reduce 
racial stratification in the traditional public schools, compared to 45% in private schools. When 
we narrow the sample to just the districts under federal desegregation orders— arguably, the 
highest priority schools—75% of transfers are stratification-reducing in the public schools and 
there are null effects in private schools.  
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Limitations 
There are some noteworthy limitations to this set of studies. First, both school voucher 
programs examined were just in their first year of operation at the time these competitive effects 
studies were conducted. Enrollment in these programs grew every year after that first year as 
more students learned about the programs and applied for a private school voucher. As such, the 
competition generated by these programs was likely at its weakest at the time these studies were 
conducted. Once later years of data become available, it will be interesting to test how the 
coefficient on the competition variables changes— whether it grows in magnitude, changes 
direction, or loses statistical significance.  
Second, both of these voucher programs are means-tested, meaning they are designed to 
target low-income students, not the universe of public school students. This feature of program 
design may significantly shape the public schools’ perception of the program. It is even possible 
that public schools could be supportive of a program that attracts their poorest and possibly 
hardest-to-educate students. Instead of viewing these targeted voucher programs as a threat to 
which they must respond, public schools may actually view them as a release valve and welcome 
the programs as a positive outlet to which they can direct struggling students. 
Third, it is important to acknowledge the limited set of outcomes examined in articles one 
and two, which measure the effect of private school competition on math and English language 
arts test scores only. These two tested subjects certainly do not reflect the sum total of a public 
school experience. It could be the case that public schools focused on science, art, music, or 
social studies as a mechanism to retain students who would be eligible for the voucher program. 
Alternatively, they could have responded to family preferences by offering more diverse 
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electives, for example, by conducting renovations on school facilities, or by taking active steps to 
better market their school (Holley, Egalite, & Lueken, 2013). Furthermore, it might also be 
possible that the effects of competition might be felt in long-term outcomes such as 
improvements in student graduation rates or college enrollment if public schools respond to the 
competitive threat by sharpening their focus on attainment goals for students and cultivating an 
environment that prepares students for long-term success.  
 There are also some important limitations to the racial stratification study described in 
article three. First, the racial composition benchmark that we choose is relative in that it allows 
us to reasonably measure how well or how poorly a school is integrated relative to some realistic 
expectation. It is not an absolute measure however, that dictates where the benefits of integration 
might be optimally realized. Second, this analysis is designed to give a bird’s eye view of the 
general direction of the impacts of the LSP on school-level racial stratification. Thus, all 
transfers are pooled into just two broad categories— either reducing or increasing racial 
stratification. Observing that 82% of all transfers are stratification-reducing is certainly 
encouraging from a bird’s eye perspective, but that statistic doesn’t take into account how diffuse 
those transfers might be between schools. In a particular school, for example, a single student 
transfer might be rated as reducing racial stratification but if it is the only transfer to occur in that 
whole school, it will not have any real effect on the day-to-day experiences of the students 
attending that school. Put simply, if the stratification-reducing transfers we observe are dispersed 
rather sparsely across Louisiana’s public schools, the net effect of the program could appear 
positive on paper without actually altering students’ lives in any meaningful way.  
Furthermore, it is likely that whatever benefits are associated with reductions in racial 
stratification do not accrue in a linear fashion. Those benefits may be attitudinal (eg. students 
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gain an improved respect for other cultures and a reduction in prejudice); academic (eg. students 
of minority races gain access to higher-achieving peers by being placed in a more diverse school 
environment); or they may result in the eradication of stereotype threat; but our analysis 
implicitly treats all progress towards the attainment of these benefits equally. In reality, it is more 
likely that the benefits of a reduction in racial stratification follow a more complex functional 
form. Perhaps early progress boosts all of these benefits significantly, but the returns may 
diminish at a certain point and only pick up again later as full attainment of the racial 
composition goals comes within arm’s reach. Take for example a community that is 20% African 
American. In our analysis, a stratification-reducing transfer that shifts the racial composition of a 
school in that community from 100% African American to 90% African American is weighted 
exactly the same as a transfer that shifts another school in that community from 30% African 
American to 20% African American. In reality, any actual benefits associated with these two 
transfers are unlikely to be equivalent. While the move from a completely racially homogenous 
school to one that includes students from different races is certainly a significant event, the move 
from 30% to 20% may go unnoticed by most students. 
Despite the limitations outlined in this section, these articles have important implications 
for legislators and activists designing and promoting school voucher programs in the United 
States. In the next section, I outline the key takeaways for policymakers.  
 
Implications 
As large-scale school voucher programs continue to expand across the country, 
policymakers who are fearful of negative implications for traditional public schools should be 
heartened by these findings. Overall, the articles presented in this dissertation demonstrate the 
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private school choice programs have null to modest, statistically significant, positive impacts on 
the math and ELA achievement of non-participants who remain in their assigned public schools. 
Given that traditional public schools are and will continue to be the primary provider of 
educational services in K-12, it is good news that their achievement outcomes are not negatively 
impacted by the expansion of private school choice programs.  
Second, contrary to fears of the segregating effects of large-scale choice programs, article 
three of this dissertation shows that there is little basis for these fears. Although we find evidence 
of small increases in racial stratification in private schools, the effects for public schools are 
overwhelmingly positive. Particularly in school districts where desegregation concerns are to the 
forefront of administrators’ minds, the Louisiana Scholarship Program should be viewed as a 
positive force to help reduce racial stratification in the public schools. It will, of course, be 
important to continue monitoring the impact of this program on racial stratification in Louisiana 
schools, especially in private schools, as enrollment in the program continues to grow.  
 
Directions for Further Research 
There are still many unanswered questions regarding the systemic effects of large-scale 
private school choice programs. For instance, we do not have a lot of insight into how school 
leaders identify competitors. Survey work in New Orleans by Jabbar (2014) has taken an initial 
step towards addressing this question by asking public school principals to list the schools they 
perceive as rivals and using network analysis to identify ties between perceptual rivals. It would 
be fascinating to repeat her study, incorporating principals from both the public and private 
sector. Such a study would add dimensionality to our currently limited understanding of the 
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social, political, interpersonal, and economic contexts in which public and private school leaders 
identify and respond to competitors. 
Jabbar’s work also reveals the predictive power of principal gender— male leaders were 
more 2.76 times more likely to name schools as competitors. This finding is unsurprising given 
the economics literature on the relationship between gender and competition. In laboratory work 
exploring this issue, Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) show that women are more likely to shy 
away from competition than their male counterparts. It would be valuable to explore differences 
in the demographic characteristics (eg. gender, race, age) of school leadership teams in the public 
and private sectors and to analyze how these differences interact with principals’ perceptions of 
competition and what steps they take to respond to threats for students.   
Another branch of research that would help us to develop more informed, multi-
dimensional competition models would be an analysis of private school branding. Preliminary 
work on this subject by Trivitt and Wolf (2011) examined the Catholic school “brand,” showing 
that even non-Catholics are attracted to this brand and attrit from a voucher program when the 
school they select doesn’t live up to the expectations associated with that brand. As private 
school choice programs grow within the 18 states that already have established programs and the 
new states and regions that are considering introducing legislation proposing such programs, we 
can expect to see the development of new private schools that won’t have a religious affiliation. 
What mechanism will these schools use to brand themselves with? Will websites like 
www.greatschools.org play a bigger role in advertising, promoting, and sharing information 
about secular private school brands? How will this affect the potential for racial or economic 
stratification within schools? Will public schools respond by creating more differentiated public-
school brands? 
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 Many of the research questions I have proposed thus far will require more nuanced 
datasets than the administrative datasets that the articles in this dissertation rely upon. Given the 
constantly increasing prevalence and reduction in cost associated with using technology to assist 
with school administration, it will be incredibly informative if researchers can persuade schools 
to conduct climate surveys and collect data on teacher and administrator perceptions of 
competition so that we can answer behavioral questions about how school leaders act in a 
competitive environment and how their strategies change based on who they perceive to be their 
competitors on a large scale.  
The final suggestion I will offer for future research on the systemic effects of private school 
choice programs is an examination of how competitive networks are influenced by other 
networks that exist simultaneously between schools. For instance, in a given Catholic diocese, 
school leaders may collaborate to develop standards and curricula. Similar cooperative networks 
exist between public schools. This is not an uncommon phenomenon in major cities such as New 
York City, where public schools share professional development resources. Less common, are 
public/private collaborations such as the Private Schools with Public Purpose consortium, which 
encourages private schools to collaborate with public school students and teachers. Will new 
injections of competition hurt such cooperative collaborations or will it facilitate their growth as 
school leaders become more motivated to improve school practices and performance? 
Clearly, many questions on the systemic impacts of large-scale school choice programs 
remain. I concede that the direct impacts of school choice programs are easier to measure but I 
hope that the articles presented here provide evidence that it is possible to study systemic 
impacts and that we should be motivated to do so because the number of students indirectly 
impacted by these large-scale reforms is much larger than the number of students who directly 
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participate in these programs. At a minimum, I hope that these three articles can provide 
empirical evidence to inform political and legal debates around these issues.   
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